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Making Matters Worse: The Safe Streets 
and Communities Act and the Ongoing 
Crisis of Indigenous Over-Incarceration
RYAN NEWELL *
The Safe Streets and Communities Act (SSCA), a recent and wide-reaching piece of the 
Conservative Party of Canada’s tough-on-crime agenda, will exacerbate the ongoing crisis 
of Indigenous over-incarceration. In this article, I review the extensive literature that addresses 
the causes of Indigenous over-representation in the Canadian criminal justice system before 
assessing the impact of R v Gladue, nearly fi fteen years after the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision. I analyze how the SSCA will restrict courts’ resort to Gladue, thus resulting in the 
incarceration of increasing numbers of Indigenous people. I then develop one avenue of 
constitutional challenge to the SSCA’s mandatory minimum sentences that is tailored to 
Indigenous offenders. Drawing on insights from Gladue and from the cases that followed it, I 
argue that the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishment” under section 12 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms should shift in the case of Indigenous offenders to account 
for the well-established connections between colonialism and the over-incarceration of 
Indigenous people. 
La Loi sur la sécurité des rues et des communautés (LSRC), élément récent et de grande portée 
du programme de lutte contre la criminalité du Parti conservateur du Canada, exacerbera 
la crise permanente du taux d’incarcération démesurément élevé des Autochtones. Dans cet 
article, j’examine la documentation abondante qui aborde les causes de la surreprésentation 
des Autochtones dans le système canadien de justice pénale avant d’évaluer, quinze ans 
après les faits, l’impact du jugement R. c. Gladue de la Cour suprême du Canada. J’analyse la 
façon dont la LSRC restreindra la possibilité pour les tribunaux d’invoquer le jugement Gladue, 
ce qui entraînera l’incarcération d’un plus grand nombre d’Autochtones. Je développe ensuite 
une approche spécifi que aux contrevenants autochtones pour contester la constitutionnalité 
* J.D., Osgoode Hall Law School, 2012. Associate at Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP. I would 
like to thank Kent McNeil as well as the editors and anonymous reviewers for their helpful 
feedback on a previous draft of this article.
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des peines minimales obligatoires en vertu de la LSRC. Tirant parti de ce que nous apprend le 
jugement Gladue et des jugements ultérieurs, je fais valoir que la signifi cation de « châtiment 
cruel et inhabituel » en vertu de l’article 12 de la Charte Canadienne des Droits et Libertés 
devrait être modifi ée dans le cas des contrevenants autochtones afi n de tenir compte de 
la corrélation bien établie qui existe entre le colonialisme et l’incarcération démesurément 
élevée des Autochtones. 
THE SAFE STREETS AND COMMUNITIES ACT 1 (SSCA) received Royal Assent on 13 
March 2012 and its various components came into force in a staggered sequence 
between August and November 2012.2 Th e impact of the SSCA’s wide-ranging 
reforms to the Canadian criminal justice system will surely be felt for years to 
come. As the centrepiece of the Conservative Party of Canada’s tough-on-crime 
agenda, the SSCA represents a signifi cant step in a massive policy shift towards 
an expansion of the Canadian prison system. Th e legislation comes at a time 
when the Government of Canada’s own statistics demonstrate that 93 per cent of 
1. SC 2012, c 1.
2. See Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Backgrounder: Th e Safe Streets and 
Communities Act Four Components Coming Into Force” (June 2012) online: <http://www.
justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2012/doc_32759.html>.
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Canadians report that they are “satisfi ed with their personal safety from crime.”3 
Not only will the law cost millions of dollars to implement and send thousands 
more people to prison, its passage has given rise to serious tensions within the 
structure of Canadian federalism.4
The consequences of the SSCA are likely to be especially disastrous for 
Indigenous people.5 A crisis of over-incarceration among Indigenous people in 
Canada has been well documented for decades. Yet, the number of Indigenous 
people being sent to Canadian prisons continues to grow. Th e SSCA will only 
make matters worse. 
Relying on the multitude of existing research, Part I of this article explores the 
dimensions and underlying causes of the crisis of Indigenous over-representation6 
in the Canadian criminal justice system. I argue that the causes of the crisis are 
hardly a mystery; they have been well understood for decades. Part II explains 
the legislative and judicial interventions that have been undertaken to address 
the crisis and then turns to evaluate their effi  cacy in light of the insights gleaned 
from the wealth of research highlighted in Part I. Part III introduces the SSCA, 
charting the way that the draft legislation, Bill C-10, was debated in Parliament, 
in order to demonstrate that the law’s harmful eff ects were made amply clear 
before its enactment. Special attention is paid to the voices of Indigenous people 
3. Shannon Brennan, “Canadians’ Perceptions of Personal Safety and Crime, 2009” in Statistics 
Canada, Juristat (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, December 2011) at 5, online: <http://www.
statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2011001/article/11577-eng.pdf>.
4. See e.g. Tobi Cohen, “Tories Use Majority to Pass Omnibus Crime Bill,” National 
Post (12 March 2012), online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/03/12/
contentious-tory-crime-bill-passes-as-countrys-biggest-provinces-voice-concerns-over-costs/>.
5. Th e terms “Indigenous,” “Aboriginal,” “Native,” and “First Nations” have loaded political 
implications, an in-depth exploration of which is beyond the scope of this article. Th e 
term “Aboriginal” is understood by some people as connoting an inherently assimilationist 
orientation towards the Canadian state. See e.g. Taiaiake Alfred, Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways 
of Action and Freedom (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2005) at 126. Although this view 
is certainly not universally held among Indigenous people, I nonetheless choose to use the 
term “Indigenous” to acknowledge that “Aboriginal” is a contested term. Th at said, the term 
“Aboriginal” is used in many of the sources that I draw upon and analyze, including judicial 
authorities, research by governmental commissions, and academic articles by Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous scholars.  
6. I employ the terms “over-representation” and “over-incarceration” throughout this article 
somewhat reluctantly. Given many Indigenous nations’ claims to sovereignty and their 
contestation of the unilateral imposition of Canadian criminal law onto their societies, it seems 
inappropriate to articulate the problem as one of over-representation. Would any amount of 
Indigenous representation in the Canadian criminal justice system—even if it were consistent 
with the proportion of Indigenous people in the Canadian population—be appropriate?  
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and their allies who raised concerns during the debates about how Bill C-10 
would compound the ongoing crisis of over-incarceration. I then provide a basic 
outline of the elements of the SSCA that are likely to lead to the imprisonment of 
even greater numbers of Indigenous people. In Part IV, I develop one avenue of 
constitutional challenge to the SSCA’s mandatory minimum sentences that may be 
pursued by Indigenous off enders. I explore how the analysis performed by courts 
under section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 7 can be developed 
to account for the unique circumstances of Indigenous people and mobilized to 
strike down the SSCA’s mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. I investigate 
the possibility of section 12 challenges as a strategy of harm reduction in the 
face of a law that, if unchallenged, will surely have grave impacts on Indigenous 
communities across the country. By identifying opportunities to imbue the 
section 12 analytical framework with the insights of R v Gladue8 and subsequent 
jurisprudence, I argue that the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment must 
shift in the case of Indigenous off enders to address the undeniable connections 
between colonialism and the drastic over-representation of Indigenous people in 
Canadian jails and prisons.
I. INDIGENOUS OVER-INCARCERATION AND ITS CAUSES
A. THE NUMBERS
Indigenous people are drastically over-represented in the Canadian criminal justice 
system. One way to begin an analysis of what the Supreme Court of Canada 
(Court) referred to as a “crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system” 9 is with 
reference to statistics. While Indigenous people represented approximately 3 per 
cent of the total Canadian adult population according to the 2006 Census, in 
2008/2009 they constituted 27 per cent of those admitted into provincial and 
territorial prisons, 18 per cent of those admitted into federal prisons, 21 per cent 
of those on remand, and 20 per cent of those on conditional sentences. 10 Between 
1998/1999 and 2007/2008, there was a decrease in the total number of people 
admitted into provincial and territorial custody. Within that total, however, the 
7. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11 [Charter].
8. [1999] 1 SCR 688, 171 DLR (4th) 385 [Gladue cited to SCR].
9. Ibid at para 64.
10. Donna Calverley, “Adult Correctional Services in Canada, 2008/2009” in Statistics Canada, 
Juristat (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2010) at 5, online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-
002-x/2010003/article/11353-eng.pdf>. 
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proportion of Indigenous people sentenced to custody actually increased from 13 
per cent to 18 per cent.11 
Incarceration rates for Indigenous women and youth are even further skewed. 
Among all women sentenced to provincial and territorial custody between 
1998/1999 and 2007/2008, the proportion of Indigenous women increased from 
17 per cent to 24 per cent.12 In 2008/2009, Indigenous women represented 37 
per cent of all women admitted into custody.13 In the same period, Indigenous 
youth represented 36 per cent of youth admitted into custody.14 Th e proportion of 
Indigenous youth sentenced to custody is 5.5 times greater than their proportion 
of the total youth population.15 
Th e disproportionate rate of Indigenous incarceration is more severe in 
some provinces than in others. For example, in Saskatchewan, Indigenous people 
constituted 11 per cent of the total adult population in 2006 but made up 80 per 
cent of those sentenced to custody in 2008/2009.16 In Manitoba, Indigenous people 
represented 12 per cent of the total adult population but represented 71 per cent of 
those sentenced to prison over the same period.17
B. STUDIED, RESTUDIED, OVER-STUDIED18
Prompted by a crisis of less extreme, but nonetheless alarming, proportions in the 
early 1990s, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People (RCAP) undertook a 
wide-ranging study of the relationship between Indigenous people and the Canadian 
criminal justice system. Refl ecting on insights gleaned from existing research and 
its own series of public hearings at which Indigenous people across the country 
off ered their input, RCAP concluded that there was “remarkable consensus on 
some fundamental issues and, in particular, on how the justice system has failed 
11. Samuel Perreault, “Th e Incarceration of Aboriginal People in Adult Correctional Services” 
in Statistics Canada, Juristat (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, July 2009) at 5, online: <http://
www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2009003/article/10903-eng.pdf>. 
12. Ibid.
13. Calverley, supra note 10 at 11.
14. Donna Calverley, Adam Cotter & Ed Halla, “Youth Custody and Community Services in 
Canada, 2008/2009” in Statistics Canada, Juristat (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Spring 
2010) at 5, online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010001/article/11147-eng.
pdf>.
15. Ibid at 12.
16. Calverley, supra note 10 at 23. 
17. Ibid.
18. Brian R Pfeff erle, “Gladue Sentencing: Uneasy Answers to the Hard Problem of Aboriginal 
Over-Incarceration” (2008) 32:2 Man LJ 113 at 143.
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Aboriginal people.”19 Indigenous over-representation has since been referred to as 
“one of the most documented trends in the Canadian criminal justice system.”20 
Given the fact that the gravity of this crisis has been so carefully documented and 
scrutinized over the course of many years,21 how is it that the crisis has only gotten 
worse? If the problem and its purported solutions have been so well debated and 
well documented, how is it that the statistics reviewed in Part I(A), above, paint 
an even grimmer picture of the situation than that which the RCAP pictured more 
than a decade and a half ago?
I would like to acknowledge that in the following discussion of the 
underlying causes of Indigenous over-incarceration, I draw primarily on 
government-commissioned reports compiled over the course of decades. 
Many of the conclusions and recommendations found in these reports are not 
particularly revelatory to the Indigenous people who have lived for generations under 
the unilaterally imposed Canadian legal system and have struggled to maintain 
their sovereignty, distinctive cultures, and traditional governance structures. In 
fact, in some cases, Indigenous people have played crucial roles in the evidence 
gathering and authorship of these reports.22 By relying on reports commissioned 
and sanctioned by the Canadian state and the broader non-Indigenous legal 
community,23 I do not intend to perpetuate the racist paradigm that privileges 
the voices of the colonizer over those of the colonized. Rather, my intention is to 
hold the Canadian state accountable for its role in this paradigm. If an argument 
for a fundamental shift in the structure of the relationship between Indigenous 
people and the Canadian criminal justice system can be constructed with reference 
primarily to those voices whose legitimacy is authorized by the colonial state itself, 
such an argument would seem all the more diffi  cult to ignore. Given this article’s 
concern with the Canadian legal system’s relationship with Indigenous people and 
the transformations necessary to address the crisis of over-incarceration, I have 
chosen to select those sources with the most purchase within that very legal system. 
19. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on 
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 
Canada, 1996) at 26-27.
20. Pfeff erle, supra note 18 at 113.
21. Jonathan Rudin, “Addressing Aboriginal Overrepresentation Post-Gladue: A Realistic 
Assessment of How Social Change Occurs” (2009) 54:4 Crim LQ 447 at 451.
22. See e.g. RCAP, supra note 19.
23. See e.g. Michael Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada: A Report of the Committee of the 
Canadian Bar Association Committee on Imprisonment and Release (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia, 1988), reprinted in “Locking Up Natives in Canada” (1989) 23:2 UBC L 
Rev 215 [cited to reprint].
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C. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CRISIS OF OVER-INCARCERATION
As of 1996, not only was the crisis of Indigenous over-representation in the 
Canadian criminal justice system well documented, but RCAP noted as well that 
researchers and policymakers had off ered a relatively consistent set of explanations 
for the roots of the problem. RCAP’s study, in particular, was remarkable for its 
breadth and for its insistence on understanding the roots of the problem out of 
a caution that proceeding any diff erently would “provide, at best, temporary 
alleviation.”24 RCAP considered three explanatory theories for the root causes of 
the higher rates of crime among Indigenous people and their over-representation 
in the Canadian criminal justice system.25
Th e fi rst explanatory theory that RCAP identifi ed was cultural diff erence. 
Drawing on fi ndings made by the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (AJI) fi ve 
years earlier,26 RCAP discussed the ways in which divergent cultural conceptions of 
criminality and societal responses to them contribute to Indigenous alienation from 
the Canadian criminal justice system. While the Canadian criminal justice system’s 
primary objectives are the punishment of the deviant and protection of society 
through the segregation of off enders, according to the AJI, Indigenous societies tend 
to prioritize the restoration of “peace and equilibrium within the community.”27 Th e 
AJI also explored the implications arising from disparate cultural understandings of 
concepts such as guilty and not guilty, a subject explored by subsequent research-
ers as well.28 As the Law Reform Commission of Canada concluded in 1991, the 
criminal justice system is “plagued with diffi  culties arising from its remoteness—a 
term that encompasses not only physical separation but also conceptual and cultural 
distance.”29 Ultimately, AJI and RCAP alike concluded that the disproportionate rates 
of Indigenous crime and incarceration could not be explained solely with reference 
to cultural alienation. To rely exclusively on a cultural explanation for the crisis in 
the justice system would not only locate the underlying problem in Indigenous 
24. Supra note 19 at 39.
25. Ibid at 39-53.
26. Manitoba, Public Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People, Report 
of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry: Th e Justice System and Aboriginal People, vol 1 (Winnipeg: 
Province of Manitoba, 1991) (Commissioners: AC Hamilton & CM Sinclair), online: 
<http://www.ajic.mb.ca/volumel/toc.html> [“AJI”].
27. Ibid at 21. 
28. See e.g. Robynne Neugebauer, “First Nations Peoples and Law Enforcement: Community 
Perspectives on Police Response” in Robynne Neugebauer, ed, Criminal Injustice: Racism in 
the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2000) 109 at 111.
29. Report on Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice: Equality, Respect and the Search for Justice 
(Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1991) at 16. 
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cultures’ inability or unwillingness to assimilate into non-Indigenous legal culture, 
but it would also obscure the “structural problems grounded in the economic and 
social inequalities experienced by Aboriginal people.”30
Th e second explanatory theory considered by RCAP was socio-economic 
deprivation.  Th e poverty endemic in Indigenous communities has persisted in the 
seventeen years since RCAP released its report. For instance, in 2006 the median 
income among Indigenous people was 30 per cent less than that of non-Indigenous 
Canadians.31 RCAP was not the fi rst commission to connect the widespread poverty 
among Indigenous people to their increased levels of criminality and representation 
in the criminal justice system. As early as 1967, a survey prepared for the Honourable 
Arthur Laing at the Department of Indian Aff airs and Northern Development 
acknowledged that patterns of over-representation could only be understood in 
light of the dire economic conditions among Indigenous people.32 In his report 
on behalf of the Canadian Bar Association in 1988, Michael Jackson noted the 
connection between Indigenous poverty and over-representation as an example 
of “the well-known correlation between economic deprivation and criminality.”33 
RCAP further fl eshed out the nature of the connection between poverty and 
over-representation, exploring the disproportionate numbers of Indigenous persons 
who are denied bail as one manifestation of this phenomenon. Given that judges 
consider factors such as employment, possession of a fi xed address, enrollment in 
school, and strong connections to the community when assessing an accused person’s 
eligibility for bail, it is no wonder that poverty leads to an increased likelihood of 
pre-trial detention.34 Th is more frequent incidence of pre-trial detention places 
increased pressure on Indigenous people to plead guilty and curtails their capacity to 
assemble the resources necessary to prepare their defence.35 Th us, while it has been 
established repeatedly that there is a relationship between poverty and increased 
levels of criminal activity,36 the bail process’s privileging of economic security is one 
example of the way in which the criminal justice system specifi cally contributes to 
the problem of Indigenous over-incarceration. 
30. RCAP, supra note 19 at 42.
31. Daniel Wilson & David Macdonald, Th e Income Gap Between Aboriginal Peoples and the Rest 
of Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2010) at 3.
32. Canadian Corrections Association, Indians and the Law (Ottawa: Canadian Welfare Council, 
1967) at 9 (Chair: Dr Gilbert C Monture).
33. Supra note 23 at 218.
34. See RCAP, supra note 19 at 45. 
35. Ibid.
36. See e.g. AJI, supra note 26 at 90-92.
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Again, like AJI, RCAP concluded that poverty in and of itself provided an 
inadequate explanation for the disproportionate levels of Indigenous incarceration. 
Instead, RCAP suggested that Indigenous poverty has roots in the legacy and 
continuing eff ects of colonialism, the third explanation off ered for the crisis of 
Indigenous over-representation.37 As Jackson had stated eight years earlier: 
Th ere is no doubt that poverty is a factor in the over-representation of native people 
in prisons… . However, attributing the problem to poverty itself is not a suffi  cient 
explanation. Poverty itself is a product of a particular historical process which has 
aff ected native communities and the real fundamental solutions lie in the reversal 
of that process.38
Th e poverty endemic to Indigenous communities, which is well documented, 
cannot be divorced from its historical context. Rather, the “social condition of 
Aboriginal people is a direct result of the discriminatory and repressive policies that 
successive European and Canadian governments have directed towards Aboriginal 
people.”39 Indigenous poverty, the crime that fl ows from it, and the associated 
over-representation in the criminal justice system must be situated within the 
legacy and ongoing eff ects of colonialism. By Canadian colonialism I refer to a set 
of processes, which includes the unilateral imposition of Euro-Canadian colonial 
authority and the corresponding attempts to negate sovereign Indigenous systems 
of governance,40 the repeated attempts by the Canadian state to forcibly assimilate 
Indigenous people into dominant society,41 and the dispossession of Indigenous 
people of much of their land. While exploring the nuances of this history and its 
impact on Indigenous societies at large is beyond the scope of this article, framing 
the problem of over-representation in Canadian prisons in this manner has 
substantial implications for the sorts of strategies that arise as viable solutions. As 
stated in RCAP’s report on the relationship between Indigenous people and the 
Canadian criminal justice system:
[L]ocating the root causes of Aboriginal crime in the history of colonialism, 
and understanding its continuing eff ects, points unambiguously to the critical 
37. Supra note 19 at 52.  
38. Supra note 23 at 218.
39. AJI, supra note 26 at 92.
40. Kent McNeil provides a brief historical overview of the imposition of the band council 
system onto Indigenous communities in Canada and a consideration of how this imposition 
could be challenged under s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1932, c 11. See “Challenging Legislative Infringements of the 
Inherent Aboriginal Right of Self-Government” (2003) 22 Windsor YB Access Just 329.
41. For example, through the use of residential schools.
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need for a new relationship that rejects each and every assumption underlying 
colonial relationships between Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal society.42
In Part II, below, I analyze the above-noted legislative and judicial interventions in 
light of RCAP’s powerful admonition about the nature of the crisis of Indigenous 
over-incarceration and the kind of transformation necessary to address it.
II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTIONS
A. BILL C-41
An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sentencing) and other Acts in Consequence 
Th ereof43 (Bill C-41) came into force in September 1996 , bringing the widest-
ranging reforms to Canadian sentencing law in decades.44 Th e amendments that 
Bill C-41 introduced to the Criminal Code45 included a codifi cation of the common 
law of sentencing, enumerating objectives of sentencing that combined “elements 
of both moral and utilitarian theories of punishment.”46 For the purposes of this 
article, the most signifi cant feature of Bill C-41was the addition of the following 
provision to the Code:
s. 718.2: A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the 
following principles … (e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are 
reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all off enders, with 
particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal off enders.47
While there was initially some concern that the Youth Criminal Justice Act48 
would not include a similar provision directing youth courts to take into account 
the special circumstances of Indigenous youth upon sentencing,49 the fi nal version 
of the YCJA did include such a section.50
42. Supra note 19 at 52.
43. SC 1995, c 22.
44. David Daubney & Gordon Parry, “An Overview of Bill C-41 (Th e Sentencing Reform Act)” 
in Julian V Roberts & David P Cole, eds, Making Sense of Sentencing (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1999) 31 at 31.
45. RSC 1985, c C-46 [Code].
46. Clayton C Ruby et al, Sentencing, 7th ed (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 4.
47. Supra note 45.
48. SC 2002, c 1 [YCJA].
49. See Kent Roach & Jonathan Rudin, “Gladue: Th e Judicial and Political Reception of a 
Promising Decision” (2000) 42:3 Can J Crim 355 at 357-58.
50. YCJA, supra note 48, s 38(2):
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B.  R V GLADUE
In 1999, the Court was tasked for the fi rst time in R v Gladue51 with interpreting the 
signifi cance of section 718.2(e) of the Code. Justices Iacobucci and Cory authored the 
unanimous judgment of the Court, holding that the provision amounted to “more 
than simply a re-affi  rmation of existing sentencing principles”52 and evidenced a clear 
legislative direction that the unique circumstances of Indigenous people “specifi cally 
make imprisonment a less appropriate or less useful sanction.”53 Justices Iacobucci 
and Cory cited the legislative history of Bill C-41 to support the Court’s conclusion 
that Parliament intended section 718.2(e) to address the drastic over-incarceration of 
Indigenous people.54 For example, the Court cited the Minister of Justice’s testimony 
before the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Aff airs to demonstrate the 
legislative purpose behind section 718.2(e): “[T]he reason we referred specifi cally there 
to aboriginal persons is that they are sadly overrepresented in the prison populations of 
Canada.”55 Th e Court found further support for this interpretation of section 718.2(e) 
in extensive social science research and the several commissions and inquiries on the 
subject, many of which are referenced in Part I, above.56
Th e Court recognized that the contextualized sentencing methodology codifi ed 
in section 718.2(e) could not alone remedy a problem of such gravity:
Th e unbalanced ratio of imprisonment for aboriginal off enders fl ows from a number 
of sources, including poverty, substance abuse, lack of education, and the lack of 
employment opportunities for aboriginal people. It arises also from bias against ab-
original people and from an unfortunate institutional approach that is more inclined to 
refuse bail and to impose more and longer prison terms for aboriginal off enders. Th ere 
are many aspects of this sad situation which cannot be addressed in these reasons. What 
can and must be addressed, though, is the limited role that sentencing judges will play in 
remedying injustice against aboriginal peoples in Canada.57
A youth justice court that imposes a youth sentence on a young person shall determine the 
sentence in accordance with the principles set out in section 3 and the following principles: … 
(d) all available sanctions other than custody that are reasonable in the circumstances should be 
considered for all young persons, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal 
young persons… .
51. Supra note 8.
52. Ibid at para 33.
53. Ibid at para 37.
54. Ibid at paras 45-48.
55. House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice 
and Legal Aff airs, 35th Leg, 1st Sess, No 62 (17 November 1994) at 15, cited in Gladue, 
supra note 8 at para 47.
56. Ibid at paras 58-63.
57. Ibid at para 65.
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Th e Court developed a framework for sentencing judges’ use of the remedial 
authority under section 718.2(e). A sentencing judge may take judicial notice of 
and consider the following background factors in determining the appropriate 
sentence for an Indigenous off ender:
Th e unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in 
bringing the particular aboriginal off ender before the courts; and
Th e types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the 
circumstances for the off ender because of his or her particular aboriginal heritage 
or connection.58
In defi ning the types of considerations that would fall within the former 
category, the Court acknowledged poverty, lack of education and employment, 
social dislocation, community fragmentation, and substance abuse as key factors 
leading to Indigenous over-representation in the criminal justice system.59 Justices 
Iacobucci and Cory indicated that the latter set of considerations fl ows from the 
concept of restorative justice. Th e Court contrasted the principles that traditionally 
guide sentencing within the Canadian legal system—deterrence, separation, and 
denunciation—with those that guide the community-based sanctions used in 
many Indigenous communities.60 While the Court acknowledged that Indigenous 
perspectives on sentencing vary widely across the diversity of nations, it also observed 
that, “for many if not most aboriginal off enders, the current concepts of sentencing are 
inappropriate because they have frequently not responded to the needs, experiences, 
and perspectives of aboriginal people or aboriginal communities.”61
1. THE RECEPTION OF GLADUE
Gladue has been received as a welcome development by many scholars, advocates, 
and practitioners concerned with Indigenous over-incarceration and alienation 
from the mainstream criminal justice system at large.62 Soon after the Court’s 1999 
58. Ibid at para 66.
59. Ibid at paras 67-68.
60. Ibid at paras 70-74.
61. Ibid at para 73.
62. Th is is not to suggest that there have been no critiques of Gladue. For example, Phillip 
Stenning and Julian V. Roberts’ critique of the methodology employed by the Court in 
Gladue has provoked controversy for exaggerating the regional variation of Indigenous over-
representation and for downplaying the unique situation of Indigenous people in relation to 
the criminal justice system. See “Empty Promises: Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the 
Sentencing of Aboriginal Off enders” (2001) 64:1 Sask L Rev 137. See also Jonathan Rudin 
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decision, Justice M.E. Turpel-Lafond called Gladue “an important watershed in 
Canadian criminal law.”63 She suggested that “[a]s a barometer of Canadian law, 
the Gladue decision certainly registers as a vital departure point… . Perhaps this 
is no more than the history of the common law with its dialectic of stability and 
change, but I suspect something more profound is at work.”64 In the fi rst of their 
many articles analyzing the decision’s impact, Kent Roach and Jonathan Rudin 
wrote that “[t]here is much to be glad about in Gladue.”65 Even among scholars 
who have formulated critiques of aspects of the decision or raised questions about 
its implications, there is widespread acknowledgment that Gladue represents 
a signifi cant step in the development of the law of sentencing. For instance, 
Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey expressed concern about the potential for the application of 
restorative justice principles in the context of gendered violence cases to “excuse 
violence against women [and] perpetuate their subordination and victimization.”66 
Nonetheless, she celebrated the contextual sentencing methodology outlined in 
Gladue as a strategy for the decolonization of the relationship between Indigenous 
people and the Crown: 
[I]t is attentive to the historical, systemic, and structural processes rooted in 
colonialism that infl uence the material conditions of many Aboriginal people 
and their socio-economic marginality today and, in turn, contribute to their 
over-representation in the criminal justice system in complex ways.67
Th us, Gladue inspired high hopes. However, as the statistical overview in Part 
I(A), above, demonstrates, the crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration has continued 
to grow over the approximately fourteen years since the Court developed the 
analytical framework to guide the application of section 718.2(e) of the Code. 
Th is trend of rising incarceration rates among Indigenous people is all the more 
troubling given that Canadian incarceration rates are otherwise on the decline. Many 
commentators agree with the Court that “sentencing innovation by itself cannot 
& Kent Roach, “Broken Promises: A Response to Stenning and Roberts’ ‘Empty Promises’” 
(2002) 65:1 Sask L Rev 3; David Daubney, “Nine Words: A Response to ‘Empty Promises: 
Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the Sentencing of Aboriginal Off enders’” (2002) 65:1 
Sask L Rev 63.
63. “Sentencing within a Restorative Justice Paradigm: Procedural Implications of R. v. Gladue” 
(1999) 43:1 Crim LQ 34 at 35. 
64. Ibid at 50.
65. Supra note 49 at 383.
66. “Sentencing Aboriginal Off enders: Balancing Off enders’ Needs, the Interests of Victims and 
Society, and the Decolonization of Aboriginal Peoples” (2007) 19:1 CJWL 179 at 195.
67. Ibid at 185.
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remove the causes of aboriginal off ending and the greater problem of aboriginal 
alienation from the criminal justice system.”68 In fact, Toni Williams argues that 
“sentencing can play no more than a limited role in keeping Aboriginal people out 
of prison.”69 Nonetheless, there is broad consensus that contextual sentencing in 
the spirit of Gladue has a role to play, however limited, in addressing Indigenous 
over-representation. After all, “[s]entencing reform cannot cure the multiple causes 
of over-incarceration, but judges make the ultimate decision whether aboriginal 
off enders go to jail.”70
In Part I(B)(2-3), below, I explore two of the explanations for why the number 
of Indigenous people sentenced to custody has continued to grow even in the 
wake of Gladue. However, it is important to acknowledge at the outset that the 
eff ectiveness of Gladue is impossible to accurately assess without knowing how 
much worse the crisis would be without the legislative and judicial interventions 
described here. While the rate of Indigenous incarceration has continued to 
increase in the last fi fteen years, it is presumed that the dimensions of the current 
crisis would likely be even worse had it not been for the advent of contextualized 
sentencing for Indigenous off enders.
2. CONTEXTUALIZED SENTENCING AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE 
OFFENCE
Gladue has been criticized for its ambiguous treatment of the way the unique 
systemic and background factors it identifi es are to be applied in the context of 
serious or violent off ences. R v Ipeelee, a recent decision of the Court, has provided 
a welcome clarifi cation of this issue.71 But before analyzing the signifi cance 
of the Court’s clarifi cation of the law in Ipeelee, it is important to examine the 
source of the oft-criticized ambiguity in Gladue. Th e following passage has been 
cited regularly by lower courts to support longer custodial sentences in certain 
circumstances: “Generally, the more violent and serious the off ence the more 
likely it is as a practical reality that the terms of imprisonment for aboriginals and 
non-aboriginals will be close to each other or the same, even taking into account 
their diff erent concepts of sentencing.”72 Williams has argued that this excerpt 
68. Gladue, supra note 8 at para 65.  
69. “Punishing Women: Th e Promise and Perils of Contextualized Sentencing for Aboriginal 
Women in Canada” (2007) 55:3 Clev St L Rev 269 at 286.
70. Roach & Rudin, supra note 49 at 358.
71. 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 SCR 433 [Ipeelee].
72. Gladue, supra note 8 at para 79.
NEWELL, MAKING MATTERS WORSE 213
clearly reveals the Court’s “ambivalence about the substantive equality project 
of sentencing Aboriginal people diff erently to reduce their over-incarceration.”73
In R v Wells,74 the Court demonstrated continued ambivalence for contextualized 
sentencing in the face of serious off ences. Justice Iacobucci emphasized that section 
718.2(e) requires sentencing judges to adopt a diff erent methodology for sentencing 
Indigenous off enders, but one that does not necessarily mandate a diff erent result.75 
Justice Iacobucci deferred to the decision of the trial judge, who placed greater 
emphasis on the sentencing principles of deterrence and denunciation given the 
seriousness of the off ence. In his words, “it will generally be the case as, a practical 
matter, that particularly violent and serious off ences will result in imprisonment 
for aboriginal off enders as often as for non-aboriginal off enders.”76 According to 
Roach, Wells represents a continuation of “the trend of ambiguity.”77
Courts have subsequently struggled to determine the place of the Gladue 
analysis in the context of serious and violent offences. Many decisions of 
provincial appellate courts have focussed more on resolving this ambiguity 
than on implementing the thrust of the Gladue analysis—that is, remedying 
the over-incarceration of Indigenous people.78 Th e way that provincial appellate 
courts have resolved this ambiguity has diverged widely.79 For instance, Roach’s 
analysis of appellate court decisions in the decade following Gladue, from 1999 to 
2009, suggests that the Courts of Appeal of British Columbia and Saskatchewan 
“have operated on the assumption that Gladue does not really apply in cases that 
are particularly serious.”80 Th at the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has narrowed 
the scope of Gladue in this manner is especially troublesome given that the over-
incarceration of Indigenous people is the highest in that province.81
73. Supra note 69 at 278.
74. 2000 SCC 10, [2000] 1 SCR 207 [Wells]. 
75. Ibid at para 44.
76. Ibid, citing Gladue, supra note 8 at para 33.
77. “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Gladue at Ten and in the Courts of Appeal” (2009) 
54:4 Crim LQ 470 at 478.
78. Roach concedes that an appeal by both the Crown and the accused are more probable in 
the context of serious off ences and, consequently, that his dataset of appeal cases might not 
be representative of the issues that surface elsewhere in the Gladue jurisprudence. See ibid at 
503-04.  
79. Ibid at 479-99.
80. Ibid at 504.
81. As stated in Part I(A), above, in 2006 Indigenous people made up 11 per cent of the total 
adult population of Saskatchewan but represented 80 per cent of those sentenced to custody 
in 2008/2009. See Calverley, supra note 10 at 23.
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In Ipeelee, the Court addressed “the irregular and uncertain application of the 
Gladue principles to sentencing decisions for serious or violent off ences.”82 Th e Court 
heard appeals concerning the sentencing of two off enders, an Inuk man named Manasie 
Ipeelee and Frank Ralph Ladue of the Ross River Dena Council Band. Both off enders 
had long criminal records, had been declared long-term off enders, and as a result 
were the subject of long-term supervision orders (LTSO). Mr. Ipeeleee committed an 
off ence while intoxicated, in violation of his LTSO, and was sentenced to three years’ 
imprisonment. Th e Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. He appealed further 
to the Court. Mr. Ladue failed a urine test, which was positive for cocaine, and in 
doing so breached his LTSO. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Upon 
appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal reduced his custodial sentence to one 
year. Th e Crown appealed the Court of Appeal’s decision. Th e issue before the Court 
was the manner in which to determine a proper sentence for Indigenous off enders who 
have breached an LTSO. As a result, the Court was presented with an opportunity to 
clarify how the Gladue analysis should operate in the sentencing of serious off enders. 
Writing for the majority, Justice LeBel held that the Gladue analysis is equally 
applicable to serious and violent off ences, given that the eff ect of exempting them 
would essentially “deprive s. 718.2(e) of much of its remedial power.”83 Justice 
LeBel endeavoured to resolve the above-described ambiguity by declaring that 
the “application of the Gladue principles is required in every case involving an 
Aboriginal off ender … and a failure to do so constitutes an error justifying appellate 
intervention.”84 In the case of Mr. Ipeelee, the majority held that the courts below had 
failed to adequately consider the sentencing objective of rehabilitation and substituted 
a sentence of one year. In contrast, the Crown’s appeal of Mr. Ladue’s sentence was 
dismissed. Th e majority held that the Court of Appeal’s substitution of a one-year 
sentence was based on a proper application of the relevant sentencing principles.
Th e Court’s pronouncements about the application of Gladue in the context 
of serious off ences are welcome. It is diffi  cult to imagine a more resolute expression 
from the Court that the remedial potential of Gladue is by no means to be limited 
to less serious off ences.
Although regionally inconsistent,85 limitation of the applicability of the Gladue 
analysis in the context of serious off ences is one factor that must be considered 
82. Supra note 71 at para 84.
83. Ibid at para 86.
84. Ibid at para 87.
85. For example, the Ontario Court of Appeal is on the other end of the spectrum of appellate 
court reception of Gladue. Rudin argues that “[t]he Ontario Court of Appeal, among all the 
appellate courts, has appeared to embrace Gladue most wholeheartedly.” See supra note 21 at 
459.
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in understanding why rates of Indigenous incarceration have continued to grow 
since 1999. Ipeelee represents a signifi cant clarifi cation of the law that cannot be 
ignored by appellate and lower courts. Th e Court has sent a strong message that 
the contextualized sentencing model elucidated in Gladue is equally applicable 
in cases of serious off enders. While the ability of Gladue to help reduce the rates 
of over-incarceration of Indigenous off enders has been seriously curbed by the 
Court’s ambiguous treatment of the Gladue analysis for serious off ences, Ipeelee 
off ers a reason to hope that the potential of the contextualized sentencing model 
could still be realized.
3. PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS
For the Gladue analysis to be operationalized eff ectively, the sentencing system 
itself must change. Sentencing judges cannot adequately determine the proper 
sentence for an Indigenous off ender in the manner envisioned by Gladue without 
access to information about the circumstances of the off ender and the availability 
of restorative justice alternatives to imprisonment.86 In the wake of Gladue, Justice 
Turpel-Lafond argued that if the analysis was to have the desired eff ect, Crown 
counsel, defence counsel, and the judiciary would all need to “adjust their practice 
to refl ect the requirements of the decision.”87  
One such adaptation can be observed in Toronto’s Gladue Courts. After a 
year of discussions among several judges of the Ontario Court of Justice at the 
Toronto Old City Hall Court and Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto (ALST), 
the fi rst Gladue (Aboriginal Persons) Court in Canada began hearing cases in 
2001.88 In subsequent years, two other Gladue Courts have opened in Toronto.89 
According to Rudin, one of the features that distinguishes the procedural reality 
of Gladue Courts from that of the traditional court-room is the role of the Gladue 
Caseworker.90 Gladue Caseworkers provide the sentencing judge with information 
about the off ender’s background and the availability of alternatives to incarceration. 
Caseworkers compile this information in pre-sentencing reports under section 721 
86. Ibid at 453-55.
87. Supra note 63 at 37. 
88. See Judge Brent Knazan, “Sentencing Aboriginal Off enders in a Large City – Th e 
Toronto Gladue (Aboriginal Persons) Court” (Paper delivered at the National Judicial 
Institute Aboriginal Law Seminar, Calgary, 23-25 January 2003) at 3-4, online: <http://
aboriginallegal.ca/docs/Knazan.pdf>.
89. See Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto, Gladue (Aboriginal Persons) Court, online: <http://
www.aboriginallegal.ca/gladue.php>.
90. Supra note 21 at 464.
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of the Code.91 Caseworkers play an integral information-gathering role without 
which sentencing judges would be left to rely exclusively on the submissions of 
counsel to undertake the Gladue analysis. ALST has since begun providing Gladue 
Caseworker services in other Southern Ontario cities such as Hamilton, Brantford, 
Kitchener, and Guelph.92 Furthermore, Gladue-related services have also become 
available in Sarnia, Th under Bay, and the Manitoulin District.93
While the availability of Gladue Caseworkers and related services has expanded 
considerably in the last decade, many jurisdictions in Canada do not have the 
necessary procedural innovations in place to give eff ect to the Gladue analysis. 
Th e approach outlined in this section is by no means the only way of modifying 
existing sentencing structures to make room for Gladue to operate.94 Th e foregoing 
discussion does not comprehensively summarize the post-Gladue innovations that 
have been undertaken. I off er the preceding description of the Gladue Court and 
Caseworker programs to emphasize that while Gladue represented an important 
step “on the road to change,” it cannot be understood as an “end point on that 
road.”95 In other words, while it is largely accepted that the sentencing process 
can have only a limited impact on the crisis of Indigenous over-representation in 
Canadian prisons, the full extent of Gladue’s potential cannot be properly assessed 
in the absence of widespread procedural adaptation aimed at facilitating the 
contextualized sentencing model. Given the large swaths of the country that have 
not undergone adaptation on the scale described here,96 it is not at all surprising 
that the crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration persists.
91. See Brent Knazan, “Time for Justice: One Approach to R. v. Gladue” (2009) 54:4 Crim LQ 
431 at 437-38.
92. See ibid at 466-67.
93. Department of Justice, Ontario - Location of Aboriginal Justice Strategy Programs in Canada 
(30 April 2013), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/fund-fi na/acf-fca/ajs-sja/cf-pc/
location-emplace/ont.html>.
94. Jonathan Rudin, Program Director at ALST and advocate for the Gladue Caseworker model, 
writes: “Th e Ontario experience is not presented as the perfect example of the needed 
response to Gladue. Rather the Ontario experience is an example of how change can occur 
in the system through a combination of forces outside of government.” See supra note 21 at 
468.
95. Ibid at 459.
96. For another example of such an adaptation—the First Nations Court in Vancouver—see 
Simon Owen, “A Crack in Everything: Restorative Possibilities of Plea-Based Sentencing 
Courts” (2010) 48 Alta L Rev 847 at 881-86.
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III. THE SAFE STREETS AND COMMUNITIES ACT: OMNIBUS 
COMING THROUGH
Bill C-10, the Safe Streets and Communities Act,97 is a large omnibus law made up 
of several smaller bills, most of which were initially introduced by the Conservative 
Party while they were a minority government. In 2011, the Conservatives campaigned 
on a platform promising signifi cant reforms to the Canadian criminal justice 
system within the fi rst one hundred sitting days in Parliament. Upon receiving 
a majority of the House of Commons in May 2011, the Conservatives made 
the enactment of the SSCA a priority. In their fi rst speech from the Th rone, the 
Conservatives committed to “move quickly to reintroduce comprehensive law-
and-order legislation to combat crime and terrorism.”98 On 12 March 2012, the 
Conservatives made good on their campaign promise when the bill was passed by 
the House of Commons.99 Bill C-10 received Royal Assent on 13 March 2012 ,100 
and the various parts of the bill came into force in a staggered fashion between 
June and November 2012.101
More than one hundred pages long, the SSCA amended several statutes: the 
Criminal Code,102 the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act,103 the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act,104 the Corrections and Conditional Release Act,105 the 
97. Supra note 1.
98. Parliament, Speech from the Th rone to Open the First Session Forty First Parliament of Canada 
(3 June 2011), online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/Documents/Th roneSpeech/41-
1-e.html>. Th e Conservatives have continued to advance their tough-on-crime agenda, 
pledging in their most recent Th rone speech to ensure that the “rights of victims come 
before the rights of criminals.” See Speech from the Th rone to Open the Second Session Forty 
First Parliament of Canada (16 October 2013), online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/
Documents/Th roneSpeech/41-2-e.html>.
99. Gloria Galloway & Rhéal Séguin, “Harper’s Promise Fulfi lled as House Passes Crime 
Bill,” Th e Globe and Mail (12 March 2012) online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/politics/ottawa-notebook/harpers-promise-fulfi lled-as-house-passes-crime-bill/
article535802/>.
100. Canada, Bill C-10, Safe Streets and Communities Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2012, online: 
LEGISinfo <http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Mode=1&Language=E&billI
d=5120829&View=0>. See also supra note 1.
101. Order Fixing Various Dates as the Day on which Certain Sections of the Act Come into Force, 
SI/2012-48, (2012) C Gaz II (Safe Streets and Communities Act) at 1672.
102. Supra note 45.
103. SC 1996, c 19 [CDSA].
104. SC 2001, c 27.
105. SC 1992, c 20.
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State Immunity Act,106 and the Youth Criminal Justice Act,107 among others. It also 
created a new statute, the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.108 Members of the 
Opposition criticized the Conservatives’ use of an omnibus bill to push through 
so many wide-ranging reforms. Th e SSCA’s sheer size and its complex impact on 
numerous statutory regimes made debate diffi  cult inside the walls of Parliament 
and beyond. Parliamentarians in Opposition repeatedly derided the Conservatives 
for packaging the various amendments together in a manner that prevented serious 
discussion of the relevant issues.109 As Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) 
Sean Casey stated during its second reading in the House, “[t]he bill is large and 
includes nine bills from the previous Parliament all lumped into one big buff et 
of division and fear.”110
In the months that followed, as the Bill moved through the parliamentary 
process, it received considerable media attention.111 Celebrating the principles 
articulated in Gladue, one reporter cautioned that the SSCA’s expansion of 
mandatory minimum sentencing would limit judicial discretion and, in doing so, 
“undo a decade-long eff ort to fi nd culturally specifi c ways of diverting inmates.”112 
Th e parliamentary debates and the submissions of some witnesses before the Senate 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Aff airs explored the ways that the SSCA 
was expected to contribute to the crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration.
106. RSC 1985, c S-18.
107. Supra note 48.
108. SSCA, supra note 1, s 2.
109. For example, NDP MP François Lapointe stated: 
We have a hodgepodge of legislation here that talks about child sexual predators, pardons for 
serious crimes and drug dealers. Th ese are all very socially complex elements. Each of them 
requires discussion and refl ection regarding the legal, social, ethical, philosophical and even 
religious aspects. … How can the government justify putting all of that in one big package and 
preventing Canadians from having a healthy debate on each of these important issues? Th at is 
unacceptable. How does my colleague explain that?
 See House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 18 (22 September 2011) at 1351. 
110. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 17 (21 September 2011) at 1306.
111. See e.g. Tobi Cohen, “NDP Won’t Give Up Fight over Federal Crime Bill,” Th e Windsor Star 
(28 September 2011) A6; Chris Cobb, “Fazed and Confused,” Ottawa Citizen (19 November 
2011) B1; Jordan Press, “AFN Voices Concerns about Bill’s Eff ects,” Star - Phoenix (21 
February 2012) A13.
112. Robert Everett-Green, “Law and Disorder: What Bill C-10 Could Mean for Canada’s Native 
People,” Th e Globe and Mail (18 February 2012) online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.
com/news/national/law-and-disorder-what-bill-c-10-could-mean-for-canadas-native-people/
article2342832/singlepage/>.
NEWELL, MAKING MATTERS WORSE 219
Th roughout the parliamentary debates on the SSCA, the Conservatives 
continually relied upon empty tough-on-crime rhetoric when responding to 
critics. Attorney General Rob Nicholson introduced the SSCA during its second 
reading as a refl ection of “the strong mandate that Canadians have given us to 
protect society and to hold criminals accountable.”113 Suggestions by Opposition 
members that the SSCA would contribute to Indigenous over-representation in the 
Canadian criminal justice system triggered vacuous retorts. Th ere was a repeated 
refusal on the part of the Conservatives to actually engage with the substance of 
the criticisms. When asked by New Democratic Party of Canada (NDP) MP 
Carol Hughes whether “we should be stocking our prisons with aboriginals … as 
opposed to providing rehabilitative and proper services for them,”114 Conservative 
MP Kevin Sorenson replied:
Madam Speaker, I think our prisons should be full of those who have committed 
crimes against our society and who have been found guilty in a court of law. I 
think our prisons should be a place where we can try to rehabilitate people, but 
we should hold them, incarcerate them and tell them that the penalty for crime 
is prison in some cases. … We realize that there is a high percentage of aboriginals 
in our penitentiaries, and, yes, that must be addressed as well, but in many case [sic] 
there are many aboriginal victims who are standing right there while the off ender is 
the [sic] locked in prison.115
MP Sorenson is correct that many of the victims of crime perpetrated by 
Indigenous people are themselves Indigenous. In fact, many Indigenous people who 
are charged with criminal off ences have on other occasions been the victims of crime. 
It also should not be ignored that Indigenous people implicated in the criminal justice 
system are also survivors of the genocidal policies of the Canadian state.116 However, the 
question that Sorenson and other Conservative MPs consistently evaded throughout 
the parliamentary debates was whether an increased reliance on imprisonment would 
actually address the underlying causes of crime and help to prevent future victimization. 
113. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 60 (5 December 2011) at 1297.
114. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 21 (27 September 2011) at 1555.
115. Ibid [emphasis added].
116. For the view that Indigenous people have been subjected to genocidal policies under the 
Canadian state, see e.g. Roland D Chrisjohn et al, “Genocide and Indian Residential 
Schooling: Th e Past Is Present” in Richard D Wiggers & Ann L Griffi  ths, eds, Canada and 
International Humanitarian Law: Peacekeeping and War Crimes in the Modern Era (Halifax, 
NS: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2002) 229; Bonita Lawrence, 
“Real” Indians and Others: Mixed-Blood Urban Native Peoples and Indigenous Nationhood 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004) (“[T]he underlying premise shaping 
this book [is] that urban mixed-blood Native identity cannot be adequately understood 
except as shaped by a legacy of genocide.” (ibid at xvii)).
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When asked by NDP MP Jean Crowder how the Conservatives planned to address 
the over-incarceration of Indigenous people, MP Kyle Seeback responded as follows:
Madam Speaker, my hon. colleague’s question was not particularly what I was talking 
about. We are talking about introducing legislation to protect Canadians from crime 
and to support victims of crime . We do have an aboriginal justice strategy in place 
that we are working on and working very hard to implement. However, I want to talk 
to the people who support this legislation.117
MP Seeback’s blunt admission that he would rather talk to those who support 
the SSCA than actually engage with its critics is telling. In these two statements made 
by Conservative MPs, we can observe a compartmentalization of criminal justice 
policy. While acknowledging—somewhat tacitly in the case of MP Seeback—that 
there is a problem of over-representation of Indigenous people in Canadian prisons, 
the Conservatives refused to address how the SSCA would aff ect this crisis. Instead, 
they repeatedly fell back upon tough-on-crime rhetoric and vaguely alluded to 
addressing the crisis through other means. Ironically, a key component of the 
Department of Justice’s Aboriginal Justice Strategy, which was celebrated by 
MP Seeback, involves fi nancial support for community-based justice programs 
such as sentencing circles, the use of which will undoubtedly be restricted by the 
imposition of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the SSCA.118 During 
the several days of debate on the SSCA, the Conservatives made it quite apparent 
that they were not interested in analyzing whether the SSCA would live up to its 
name and actually make Canadian streets and communities safer, especially those 
of Indigenous people. Instead, time and again they evaded pointed questions and 
rolled out hollow rhetorical fl ourishes: “Th is important legislation cracks down on 
pedophiles, drug dealers, drug producers, arsonists, and the most serious violent 
and repeat young off enders.”119
Th e SSCA was referred to the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Aff airs after passing third reading by the House on 5 December 
2011 and after receiving two readings in the Red Chamber.120 Several witnesses 
before the Senate Committee emphasized the impact that the SSCA was likely to 
have on the crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration and urged the Senate to make 
amendments before returning it to the House. Roger Jones, Senior Strategist 
117. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 22 (28 September 2011) at 1581 
[emphasis added].
118. Department of Justice, “Community-Based Justice Fund” (5 September 2013), online: 
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/fund-fi na/acf-fca/ajs-sja/cf-pc/index.html>.
119. Supra note 113 at 3974 (Hon Rob Nicholson).
120. See supra note 101.
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at the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), stated unequivocally that the SSCA 
would compound “the already unacceptable overrepresentation of our people in 
the criminal justice system.”121 Christa Big Canoe of Aboriginal Legal Services of 
Toronto emphasized that the SSCA would chip away at the gains made by the Bill 
C-41 reforms and their interpretation in Gladue:
Our largest concern with the passing of the act is that there will be an undermining 
of the principles of sentencing as set out in section 718.2 of the Criminal Code 
of Canada. When I say that, I mean the entire section, not just (e). … We believe 
that the Safe Streets and Communities Act will make the problem of Aboriginal 
over-representation in prison even worse, while at the same time not actually ad-
dressing the legitimate safety concerns of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in 
this country.122
Kim Pate of the Elizabeth Fry Society told the Senate Committee that she 
supported the goal of providing greater protection to victims. However, Pate 
argued that instituting additional mandatory minimums and restricting conditional 
sentencing would not achieve those objectives “in large part because they are 
focused on punishment after the fact, not on the sorts of measures that need to be 
in place to protect and prevent.”123 Catherine Latimer of the John Howard Society 
of Canada took the position that the SSCA was likely to make communities less 
safe “while eroding rights and principles of justice and having a disproportionate 
impact on some of the most marginalized amongst us, whether it is the poor, the 
mentally disordered, the Aboriginals or the aged.”124 
Despite urging by Indigenous advocates and their allies that the SSCA would 
fail to meet its stated objectives while also exacerbating the crisis of Indigenous 
over-incarceration, the Conservative-dominated Senate refused to amend the SSCA 
to make room for the application of the Gladue principles.125 Conservative Senator 
Daniel Lang responded to Liberal Party of Canada (Liberal) Senator Joan Fraser’s 
121. Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Aff airs, 41st Parl, 1st 
Sess, No 12 (20 February 2012) at 8.
122. Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Aff airs, 41st Parl, 1st 
Sess, No 13 (23 February 2012) at 235.
123. Ibid at 301.
124. Ibid at 303.
125. Th e Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Aff airs recommended six 
amendments to Bill C-10, all of which concerned Part I, the enactment of the Justice for 
Victims of Terrorism Act. Th e entirety of these suggested amendments was accepted by the 
Senate and the House of Commons. See “Ninth Report of the Standing Senate Committee 
on Legal and Constitutional Aff airs (Bill C-10)” in Substantive Reports, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, 
(28 February 2012).
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suggestion that attention to the specifi c circumstances of Indigenous people should 
be considered at the sentencing stage as follows:
I do have a concern for the Aboriginal community—I think we all do—in respect 
of the number of individuals who have had to go into the court system, in many 
cases, not because of their fault but because of the situation they grew up in, the 
family situations that they have had to endure in some cases, and the residential 
school situation we have all talked about. … I think I can speak for rural Canada… 
. For the life of me, to say that “Because you are Aboriginal, it is okay; we will give 
you a lighter sentence, although you have been dealing in some very serious drug 
off ences,” I just cannot buy it. It just defi es common sense.126
Senator Lang’s remarks indicate the ideological infl exibility of the Conservatives’ 
tough-on-crime agenda. While Conservative parliamentarians were willing to 
concede some of the social and historical context that gives rise to Indigenous 
over-incarceration—for example, the legacy of residential schools—in the 
Conservatives’ ideological paradigm, the applicability of contextualized sentencing 
ends precisely where the “common sense” of retributive justice begins.
Th e SSCA is certain to have a wide-ranging impact. In Part III(A-C), below, 
I briefl y outline three of the policy shifts eff ectuated by the SSCA that are likely 
to magnify the crisis of over-incarceration among Indigenous people.127  
A. MORE MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES
Mandatory minimum sentences are by no means a new phenomenon.128 
However, historical analysis of Canadian law indicates that there has been a 
“dramatic increase in recent years in [their] use.”129 Th e trend towards increased 
use of mandatory minimums fl ies in the face of widespread consensus that such 
policies are ineff ective: “Almost all domestic and international sentencing scholars, 
as well as commissions of inquiry in Canada, have decried the existence of 
mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment.”130 As stated by Elizabeth 
126. Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Aff airs, 41st Parl, 1st 
Sess, No 14 (27 February 2012) at 146.
127. By no means does Part III(A) provide an exhaustive overview of the contents of the SSCA. I 
chose instead to highlight a few aspects of the SSCA and move on to consider how it may be 
challenged.
128. See e.g. Nicole Crutcher, “Th e Legislative History of Mandatory Minimum Penalties of 
Imprisonment in Canada” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall LJ 273.
129. Nicole Crutcher, “Mandatory Minimum Penalties of Imprisonment: An Historical Analysis” 
(2001) 44:3 Crim LQ 279 at 280.
130. Julian V Roberts, “Mandatory Minimum Sentences of Imprisonment: Exploring the 
Consequences for the Sentencing Process” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall LJ 305 at 306 
[citations omitted].
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Sheehy, “[t]he sole proponents of mandatory minimum sentencing in Canada 
appear to be politicians whose positions on the advantages of these laws are without 
a clear basis in either research or policy.”131 Th e enactment of mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws is by no means an agenda exclusive to the Conservative Party of 
Canada. According to Julian Roberts, the Liberals’ 1995 enactment of ten new 
mandatory minimum sentences for fi rearms off ences through Bill C-68 represented 
the “most comprehensive collection of mandatory minima in Canadian history; 
at no other point have so many been created by a single piece of legislation.”132 
Of course, the SSCA has now surpassed the standard set by Bill C-68. Th rough 
amendments to the Code as well as the CDSA, the SSCA adds several mandatory 
minimum sentences and increases pre-existing mandatory minimums. Th e SSCA 
institutes or increases mandatory minimums for several sexual off ences, most of 
which relate to children,133 and also institutes new mandatory minimums for 
several drug off ences.134
According to Eugene Oscapella of the Canadian Foundation for Drug 
Policy, drug off ences in Canada never included mandatory minimums prior 
to the SSCA.135 Parliament’s attempt to institute a mandatory minimum for 
the importation of narcotics in the previous incarnation of the CDSA, the 
Narcotic Control Act,136 was thwarted by the Court in 1987 in R v Smith (Edward 
Dewey).137 In Smith, the Court held that a mandatory minimum sentence of 
seven years’ imprisonment for the importation of narcotics under section 5(2) 
of the NCA constituted cruel and unusual punishment under section 12 of 
the Charter.138 Th e violation of section 12 could not be justifi ed under sec-
tion 1 of the Charter and the law was declared by the Court to be of no force 
and eff ect.139 I will return to Smith and other challenges made to mandatory 
minimums under section 12 in Part IV, below, but it is worth noting at this 
stage that the Conservatives’ overhaul of the CDSA is especially signifi cant 
given this historical context.
131. “Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Law and Policy” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall LJ 261 at 
262.
132. Supra note 130 at 307.
133. Supra note 1, s 17 (amending s 163 of the Criminal Code to raise the mandatory minimum 
penalties for making, possession, distribution, and accessing child pornography).
134. Ibid, ss 39-41.
135. Canadian Drug Policy Coalition, “Th rown Under the Omnibus” (10 November 2011) 
(video), online: <http://drugpolicy.ca/2011/11/thrown-under-the-omnibus/>.
136. RSC 1970, c N1 [NCA], as repealed by the CDSA, supra note 103.
137. [1987] 1 SCR 1045, 40 DLR (4th) 435 [Smith cited to SCR].
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid. 
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Th e SSCA amends the CDSA to include a complex sequence of escalating 
mandatory minimum sentences for drug off ences depending on the existence 
of various aggravating factors. To provide one example, a person convicted of 
producing marijuana for the purposes of traffi  cking is subject to a mandatory 
minimum sentence of six months if the number of plants produced is more than 
5 but less than 201.140 However, a person convicted of producing marijuana for the 
purposes of traffi  cking is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of three years’ 
imprisonment if the number of plants produced exceeds 500141 and the accused 
used a third party’s real property in the commission of the off ence.142
One aspect of the SSCA that will mitigate the harshness of the imposition of 
mandatory minimums in select circumstances is the addition of a provision that 
allows courts to delay sentencing in order to allow an off ender to participate in a 
drug treatment court program approved by the Ministry of the Attorney General 
or to attend a treatment program as defi ned in section 720(2) of the Code.143 
Perhaps even more signifi cant is the amendment to section 10(5) of the CDSA: 
“If the off ender successfully completes a program under subsection (4), the court 
is not required to impose the minimum punishment for the off ence for which 
the person was convicted.”144 Indigenous people embroiled in the criminal justice 
system are also frequently contending with drug and alcohol issues,145 a reality 
that is clearly connected with what Jackson called the “process of dispossession 
and marginalization.”146 While the eff ectiveness of Canadian drug treatment courts 
has been questioned,147 giving accused persons the option of seeking some form of 
treatment is certainly preferable to sending them straight to prison. Sections 10(4) 
and (5) of the CDSA will likely prove to be useful tools in the hands of defence 
counsel to urge courts to soften the hard edges of mandatory minimum sentences, 
whether in the cases of Indigenous off enders or otherwise.  
To clarify, my argument is not that the specifi c off ences in respect of which the 
SSCA has introduced mandatory minimum sentences are necessarily more likely to 
140. CDSA, supra note 103, s 7(2)(b)(i), as amended by the SSCA, supra note 1, s 41.
141. CDSA, supra note 103, s 7(2)(b)(vi).
142. Ibid, s 7(3)(a).
143. Ibid, ss 10(3)-(4), as amended by the SSCA, supra note 1, s 43(2). 
144. Ibid.
145. Michelle M Mann, Good Intentions, Disappointing Results: A Progress Report on Federal 
Aboriginal Corrections (Ottawa: Offi  ce of the Correctional Investigator, 2009), online: 
<http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/pdf/oth-aut/oth-aut20091113-eng.pdf>.
146. Supra note 23 at 218.
147. See Cynthia Kirkby, “Drug Treatment Courts in Canada: Who Benefi ts?” in Perspectives On 
Canadian Drug Policy (Kingston, Ont: John Howard Society of Canada, 2004) vol 2, 59, 
online: <http://www.johnhoward.ca/document/drugs/perspect/volume2/volume2.pdf>. 
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aff ect Indigenous people. I have not undertaken a thorough demographic analysis 
of convictions for the specifi c off ences for which the SSCA creates mandatory 
minimum sentences. Larry N. Chartrand argued that mandatory minimum 
sentences for fi rearms off ences were more likely to impact Indigenous people 
because they are more likely to possess fi rearms than the rest of the population.148 
While comparable data may be available to suggest a disproportionate number of 
Indigenous people are convicted of certain off ences for which the SSCA creates 
mandatory minimum sentences,149 an exhaustive review of such research is beyond 
the scope of this article. I am less concerned with the frequency of specifi c off ences 
at hand than the broader trend towards an increased reliance on mandatory 
minimum sentencing. I contend that mandatory minimum sentences—irrespective 
of the specifi c off ences for which they are instituted—place constraints on the 
judicial discretion necessary to allow the Gladue analysis to mitigate the ongoing 
over-incarceration rates among Indigenous people. In short, more mandatory 
minimum sentences, regardless of the crimes with which they are associated, can 
only exacerbate the crisis.
B. RESTRICTION ON CONDITIONAL SENTENCES
Introduced in 1996, a conditional sentence “places restraints on the off ender’s liberty 
without completely separating the off ender from the community at large.”150 In 
eff ect, a conditional sentence allows an off ender to remain in the community as 
long as he or she adheres to certain conditions. In its submissions on the SSCA, 
the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) noted that “conditional sentences have 
helped to reduce the over-reliance on incarceration in Canada, and have gone 
a long way to ameliorating several previous problems.”151 Th e Code outlines the 
conditions that a court must impose when ordering a conditional sentence152 as 
well as several optional conditions that a court may choose to impose in certain 
148. “Aboriginal Peoples and Mandatory Sentencing” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall LJ 449 at 
456.
149. For example, according to statistics from the Off ender Management System compiled by the 
Correctional Service of Canada for 2008/2009, a larger proportion of Aboriginal off enders 
were serving prison sentences in respect of sexual off ences than their non-Aboriginal 
counterparts. However, the same report suggests that the opposite is true with respect to 
drug off ences. See Correctional Service of Canada, Th e Changing Federal Off ender Population: 
Aboriginal Off ender Highlights 2009 (18 July 2013), online: <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/
research/092/ah2009-Aboriginal_Highlights-2009-eng.pdf>. 
150. Ruby, supra note 46 at 533.
151. Submission on Bill C-10 Safe Streets and Communities Act (Ottawa: CBA, October 2011) at 
14, online: <http://www.cba.org/cba/submissions/PDF/11-45-eng.pdf>.
152. Supra note 45, s 742.3(1).
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circumstances.153 Prior to the SSCA, conditional sentences were available in limited 
circumstances as defi ned by the Code.154 For example, among other limitations, 
conditional sentences were unavailable to off enders convicted of “serious personal 
injury” off ences as defi ned in section 752 or to off enders convicted of off ences for 
which there were specifi ed mandatory minimums. 
Th e SSCA’s amendments to the Code will restrict access to conditional sentences 
even further and, in doing so, will undercut the progress made in the Gladue 
jurisprudence aimed at fi nding the least restrictive sentence possible for Indigenous 
off enders, given their circumstances. Th e most signifi cant amendment is the addition 
of a list of off ences for which conditional sentences will no longer be available if 
prosecuted by way of indictment.155 To provide a handful of examples, conditional 
sentences are no longer available for off ences such as criminal harassment,156 
motor vehicle theft,157 theft over fi ve-thousand dollars,158 and being unlawfully 
in a dwelling-house.159 Of course, the SSCA also restricts access to conditional 
sentences by instituting the additional mandatory minimums described in Part 
III(A), above. As explained in that section in reference to the SSCA’s mandatory 
minimum sentences, I am less concerned with the specifi c off ences for which the 
SSCA restricts access to conditional sentencing than with the general trend towards 
increased reliance on incarceration. Restricting access to conditional sentences 
removes one tool previously available to courts to mitigate the over-incarceration 
of Indigenous people.  
Research by Elspeth Kaiser-Derrick off ers a stark illustration of the impact 
the SSCA will have on the availability of conditional sentences to Indigenous 
off enders.160 Kaiser-Derrick reviewed ninety-one cases of Indigenous women 
off enders to assess the ways that courts account for the Gladue factors. Of the 
ninety-one cases that Kaiser-Derrick analyzed between 1999 and 2011, thirty-one 
resulted in conditional sentences.161 She came to the following startling conclusion 
about how these thirty-one cases would be decided in the wake the SSCA:
153. Ibid, s 742.3(2).
154. Ibid, s 742.1.
155. Ibid, s 742.1(f ), as amended by the SSCA, supra note 1, s 34(f ).
156. Code, supra note 45, s 742.1(f )(ii).
157. Ibid, s 742.1(f )(vii).
158. Ibid, s 742.1(f )(viii).
159. Ibid, s 742.1(f )(x).
160. Listening to What the Criminal Justice System Hears and the Stories It Tells: Judicial Sentencing 
Discourses about the Victimization and Criminalization of Aboriginal Women (LL.M. Th esis, 
University of British Columbia, 2012) [unpublished].
161. Ibid.
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Following the 2012 s. 742.1 amendments, 29 of those 31 conditional sentence 
orders would no longer be possible. Th at bears repeating: either immediately on 
the law, or because on the facts the Crown proceeded by indictment for a hybrid 
off ence now excluded by s. 742.1, 29 of the 31 Aboriginal women that received 
conditional sentence orders in my research would no longer be eligible for conditional 
sentences for the same off ences/facts today. For one further case, I was unable to 
determine whether that off ender would remain eligible for a conditional sentence, 
because the answer hinged on whether the Crown proceeded by indictment or 
summarily, which is unclear in the judgment. I only found one decision of the 
31 that actually resulted in a conditional sentence order that would continue to be 
eligible for a conditional sentence order after the 2012 amendments. To be clear, 
that means that those 29 (possibly 30, depending on the answer for the judgment 
I could not conclusively settle) criminalized Aboriginal women would likely have 
been sent to prison instead under the current 2012 law (although perhaps in limited 
cases a strict probationary term may have been ordered). Th is regressive turn in 
sentencing law is deeply troubling, and threatens to further exacerbate the ongoing 
problem of overrepresentation.162
C. CHANGES TO THE YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT
Part 4 of the SSCA, formerly Bill C-4, amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act163 in 
ways that will likely increase the incarceration rates of Indigenous young off enders. 
While Part 4 is bound to have a negative impact on non-Indigenous youth who 
come into contact with the criminal justice system, like many parts of the SSCA, 
it is likely to have a disproportionately negative impact on Indigenous youth 
and magnify the rates of Indigenous youth over-incarceration noted in Part I(A), 
above.164 In their submissions on Bill C-4, Justice for Children and Youth (JFCY) 
called the amendments a “reaction to fear-mongering and not evidence-based 
leadership, misdirecting signifi cant energy and resources… .”165 Th e CBA noted 
that many of the aspects of Part 4 of the SSCA would only serve to undermine 
the “unmitigated success” of the YCJA, which had led to the imposition of fewer 
“custodial sentences” on youth.166
Th e YCJA, as amended by the SSCA, will undoubtedly undercut an important 
objective described in the statute’s Preamble: the creation of “a youth criminal justice 
162. Ibid at 261 [emphasis in the original] [citations omitted].
163. Supra note 48.
164. See Calverley, Cotter & Halla, supra note 14.
165. Justice for Children and Youth’s Submissions re: Bill C-4: An Act to amend the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act and to make consequential and related amendments to other Acts (Sebastien’s 
Law – Protecting the Public from Violent Young Off enders) (Toronto: JFCY, 2010), online: 
<http://www.jfcy.org/PDFs/Bill%20C4_JFCY_Position_Final.pdf>.
166. Supra note 151 at 7-8.
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system that … reduces the over-reliance on incarceration for non-violent young 
persons… .”167 I will outline three principal ways that the SSCA will lead to more 
incarceration of Indigenous youth. Firstly, the SSCA will increase the likelihood 
that accused youth will be subjected to pre-trial detention. For example, as long as 
other pre-conditions are satisfi ed, the YCJA now directs courts to consider pre-trial 
detention of off enders with a “history that indicates a pattern of either outstanding 
charges or fi ndings of guilt… .”168 Given the large number of Indigenous youth 
who have criminal justice histories, this provision will likely lead courts to order 
pre-trial detention more frequently in the cases of Indigenous youth. Secondly, the 
SSCA adds deterrence and denunciation to the list of principles that a court should 
consider upon sentencing a young off ender.169 According to JFCY, prevailing social 
science research indicates that young off enders do not “engage in a cost-benefi t 
thought process when contemplating on whether or not to commit a particular 
act.”170 As such, the addition of the principle of deterrence to a youth court’s 
sentencing considerations is unlikely to eff ectively deter would-be repeat young 
off enders and will only result in the imposition of lengthier custodial sentences. 
Th irdly, the SSCA encourages the Attorney General to apply to the youth justice 
court for the imposition of adult sentences in certain circumstances.171 In the event 
that a youth over the age of fourteen is found guilty of a “serious violent off ence,” 
the adult sentence for which would exceed two years, the Attorney General is 
obliged to consider applying to the court for an adult sentence.172 
AFN National Chief Shawn Atleo told the Standing Senate Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Aff airs that Indigenous youth are “more likely to end 
up in jail than in school.”173 Unfortunately, with the SSCA’s amendments to the 
YCJA, the situation of Indigenous youth will be made even worse. Th e three 
amendments outlined above will lead to the incarceration of greater numbers of 
Indigenous youth.  
It is apparent from this sketch of three policy shifts included in the SSCA—the 
expansion of mandatory minimum sentencing, the restriction on conditional 
sentencing, and the increased emphasis on incarceration in the YCJA—that the 
SSCA is likely to exacerbate the crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration. In Part IV, 
below, I examine how the mandatory minimum sentences imposed by the SSCA 
167. Supra note 48.
168. Ibid, s 29(2)(ii).
169. Ibid, ss 38(2)(f )(i)-(ii).
170. Supra note 165 at 10.
171. YCJA, supra note 48, ss 64(1) and (1.1), as amended by the SSCA, supra note 1, s 176(1).
172. YCJA, supra note 48, s 64(2).
173. Supra note 121 at 16.
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can be challenged on constitutional grounds in order to maintain and build upon 
the positive, although limited, gains made through Bill C-41 and the Gladue model 
of contextualized sentencing for Indigenous off enders.
IV. CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SSCA
Constitutional challenges will undoubtedly be brought by Indigenous people to 
several aspects of the SSCA. I have chosen to focus on constitutional challenges 
that may be brought to strike down mandatory minimums and carve out space 
for the judicial discretion necessary to apply the Gladue analysis. Such challenges 
may be brought under a number of diff erent provisions of the Charter—including 
sections 7,174 12, and 15175—and under section 35176 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . 
A review of the arguments that could be made by Indigenous off enders challenging 
the SSCA under each of these provisions is beyond the scope of this article. Instead 
I will provide an overview of the section of the Charter that has most frequently 
been relied upon in legal challenges to mandatory minimums: section 12. In doing 
so, I aim to sketch a basic outline of the relevant jurisprudence and point to some 
of the ways the section 12 analytical framework may be developed to account 
for the unique circumstances of Indigenous people facing mandatory minimum 
sentences under the SSCA.
   
174. For examples of cases involving Indigenous off enders challenging mandatory minimum 
sentences under s 7, see R v Martin, 2005 MBQB 185, 203 Man R (2d) 214 [Martin]; R v 
Boissoneau, 2006 ONCJ 561, 75 WCB (2d) 338 [Boissoneau]; R v King, 2007 ONCJ 238, 
221 CCC (3d) 71 [King]; R v Bressette, 2010 ONSC 3831, 221 CRR (2d) 183 [Bressette]; R 
v TMB, 2011 ONCJ 528, 247 CRR (2d) 117, aff ’d 2013 ONSC 4019 (available on CanLII) 
[TMB]. For a recent case involving a non-Indigenous off ender who successfully challenged a 
mandatory minimum on the basis of s 7, see R v Smickle, 2012 ONSC 602, 110 OR (3d) 25 
[Smickle].
175. For examples of cases involving Indigenous off enders challenging mandatory minimums on 
the basis that they violate s 15, see Boissoneau, supra note 174; King, supra note 174; TMB, 
supra note 174.
176. In his article about mandatory minimums and their impact on Indigenous people, Chartrand 
argues:
[S]ection 718.2(e) as it applies to Aboriginal off enders may be viewed as a statutory affi  rma-
tion of an Aboriginal right to have traditional concepts of social dispute resolution applied in 
sentencing. A violation of the principles in section 718.2(e) would in turn be regarded as a 
violation of section 35(1) of the Constitution.
See supra note 148 at 463. 
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A. SECTION 12 OF THE CHARTER: JUST HOW “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL”?
Section 12 of the Charter provides: “Everyone has the right not to be subjected to 
any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”177 Generally speaking, mandatory 
minimum sentences have thus far withstood the Court’s scrutiny under section 
12.178 As mentioned in Part III(A), above, one notable exception was Smith,179 
the fi rst decision of the Court to consider the signifi cance of section 12. In that 
case, the Court was tasked with determining whether a seven-year mandatory 
minimum under section 5(1) of the Narcotics Control Act for the importation 
of drugs constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Lamer decided that 
the test for section 12 was “one of gross disproportionality, because it is aimed 
at punishments that are more than merely excessive.”180 Th e analysis takes place 
in two stages.181 First, the specifi c circumstances of the accused are examined in 
relation to the minimum sentence in order to determine if it would be grossly 
disproportionate to impose such a sentence. Second, “reasonable hypothetical 
circumstances”182 are considered to determine if the mandatory minimum could 
be grossly disproportionate in other potential cases. 
In Smith, the Court listed the following factors as relevant to the determination 
of gross disproportionality under section 12: 
[T]he gravity of the off ence, the personal characteristics of the off ender and the par-
ticular circumstances of the case [must be considered] in order to determine what 
range of sentences would have been appropriate to punish, rehabilitate or deter this 
particular off ender or to protect the public from this particular off ender.183 
In R v Latimer, the Court identifi ed additional factors from the jurisprudence 
that followed Smith:
[T]he actual eff ect of the punishment on the individual, the penological goals and 
sentencing principles upon which the sentence is fashioned, the existence of valid 
alternatives to the punishment imposed, and a comparison of punishments imposed 
for other crimes in the same jurisdiction.184 
177. Supra note 7.
178. See Ruby, supra note 46 at 510.
179. Supra note 137.
180. Ibid at para 55.
181. Ibid at para 37.
182. R v Goltz, [1991] SCR 485 at 506, 61 BCLR (2d) 145 [Goltz].
183. Supra note 137 at para 56.
184. 2001 SCC 1, [2001] 1 SCR 3 at para 75 [Latimer].
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Considered alone, none of these factors is determinative of gross dispro-
portionality. Rather, the goal under section 12 is to arrive at “a full contextual 
understanding of the sentencing provision.”185 Some of the factors may not be 
relevant in certain cases.186 
Th e emphasis in Smith was on the second stage of this analysis. In holding that 
there was a violation of section 12, Justice Lamer conjured up a hypothetical small-
time drug off ender who might be caught within the “wide net cast by s. 5(1)”187 
and determined that a sentence of seven years’ incarceration would constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment in the imagined circumstances. Justice Lamer held 
that the mandatory minimum violated section 12 and was not justifi able under 
section 1 even though the facts underlying the appellant’s conviction were quite 
distinct from those of the hypothetical small-time off ender that he imagined.188
Smith has been called the “high watermark” of section 12 jurisprudence.189 But 
in the twenty-fi ve years that have followed Smith, the Court’s section 12 analysis 
has been gradually restricted as a tool for challenging mandatory minimums. Jamie 
Cameron has observed, “Any expectation that the jurisprudence would blossom 
after Smith was dashed by a series of decisions which, together, show that the Court 
regards section 12 as a ‘faint hope’ guarantee of sorts—one which is available only on 
rare occasions and in exceptional circumstances.”190 Peter W. Hogg has pointed out 
that without ever explicitly overruling the approach employed by Justice Lamer in 
Smith, the Court has become increasingly deferential to Parliament when analyzing 
mandatory minimum sentences for section 12 compliance.191 Th e potency of section 
12 has been diluted considerably as the Court has limited the use of hypothetical 
examples like the one used by Justice Lamer in Smith to imagine circumstances 
in which the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence would constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment.192 Instead, the Court has become increasingly 
185. R v Morrisey, 2000 SCC 39, [2000] 2 SCR 90 at para 28 [Morrisey].
186. See Latimer, supra note 184 at para 75.
187. Supra note 137 at para 65.
188. Th e appellant pleaded guilty under s 5(1) of the NCA to importing 7.5 ounces of cocaine. 
See ibid at para 6.
189. Athar K Malik, “Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Shackling Judicial Discretion for Justice or 
Political Expediency?” (2008) 53:2 Crim LQ 236 at 239.
190. “Fault and Punishment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter” in Jamie Cameron & James 
Stribopoulos, eds, Th e Charter and Criminal Justice: Twenty-Five Years Later (Markham, Ont: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2008) 553 at 583.
191. Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf (consulted on 30 October 2013), 5th ed (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2007), ch 53 at 53-7.
192. See e.g. Morrisey, supra note 185 at para 33, Gonthier J [emphasis in the original] (stating, 
“[I]t is to be remembered that the courts are to consider only those hypotheticals that 
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focussed on the moral blameworthiness of the specifi c off ender,193 and at times 
the assessment of “reasonable hypotheticals”194 appears in the analysis as a mere 
afterthought.195 In an article reviewing the section 12 jurisprudence up to 2001, 
Roach argued that the Court had demonstrated an increasing willingness to defer 
to “Parliament’s decision to stress denunciation, retribution, and deterrence over 
specifi c deterrence, rehabilitation, and the restorative principles of sentencing.”196 
Unfortunately, the case law of the last decade has off ered no reason to question 
the continued relevance of Roach’s insights.197 
A few remarks on the remedies available under section 12 are in order. In its 
2008 decision in R v Ferguson, the Court held in obiter that when a court decides 
that a mandatory minimum violates section 12, the remedy of a constitutional 
exemption under section 24(1) of the Charter is no longer available.198 In its fi rst 
defi nitive ruling on the issue, the Court held in Ferguson that the appropriate remedy 
in such circumstances is to strike down the operative provision under section 52 
of the Constitution Act, 1982.199 Th is obiter dictum arguably makes section 12 less 
likely to provide robust protection to Indigenous off enders seeking relief from 
mandatory minimums. While provincial and superior courts might have been 
more willing to break with the prevailing trends in the section 12 jurisprudence 
and to grant constitutional exemptions from mandatory minimums for particular 
Indigenous off enders in certain circumstances,200 Ferguson will likely lead to increased 
could reasonably arise.”). See also R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 SCR 96 at para 30, 
McLachlin CJ [Ferguson]. Th e Chief Justice did not actually address specifi c hypothetical 
situations raised by the appellant in her reasons but, instead, dismissed out of hand this 
aspect of the appellant’s argument. In her view, the appellant failed to identify “a hypothetical 
case where the off ender’s minimum level of moral culpability for unlawful act manslaughter 
using a fi rearm would be less than that in the reasonable hypotheticals considered in 
Morrisey.”
193. See Malik, supra note 189 at 240.
194. See Goltz, supra note 182.
195. See e.g. Ferguson, supra note 192.
196. “Searching for Smith: Th e Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences” (2001) 39:2&3 
Osgoode Hall LJ 367 at 372.
197. Hogg has emphasized the prominence of the principle of denunciation in the Court’s s 12 
jurisprudence after Smith: “Th e Court’s new doctrine of denunciation, which seemed to drive 
the decision in Latimer and infl uenced the decision in Morrisey, will make it very diffi  cult 
if not impossible to challenge minimum mandatory sentences in the future.” See supra note 
191 at 53-13.
198. Supra note 192 at para 13.
199. Supra note 40.
200. For examples of cases prior to Ferguson in which an Indigenous accused successfully obtained 
a constitutional exemption to a mandatory minimum under s 12, see R v Massettoe, 2003 
BCPC 451, 16 WCB (2d) 578 [Massettoe]; R v Kuksiak, [1998] NWTJ No 103 (QL).
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caution among lower court judges before fi nding violations of section 12, given 
the near inevitability of appellate review after a mandatory minimum has been 
declared unconstitutional. On the other hand, the unavailability of a section 24(1) 
exemption as a remedy means that in circumstances where the unconstitutionality of 
a mandatory minimum has been established, a court will have no choice but to strike 
down the law even if gross disproportionality is unlikely to arise in most applications.
1. THE DUAL MEANING OF GROSS DISPROPORTIONALITY
Th ere are only a handful of reported cases in which Indigenous off enders have 
undertaken section 12 challenges to mandatory minimums,201 let alone have 
succeeded in doing so.202 Before turning to discuss the ways in which the section 12 
analytical framework may be infused with some of the insights contained in the 
Gladue jurisprudence, I analyze two recent decisions in which Indigenous off enders 
unsuccessfully challenged mandatory minimum sentences under section 12.
In R v Bressette, Justice Desotti of the Ontario Court of Justice held that the 
mandatory minimum sentence under section 96(2)(a) of the Code,203 possession of 
a weapon obtained by commission of an off ence, did not violate section 12.204 Th e 
accused, Jerome Lee Bressette of the Kettle Point First Nation, pleaded guilty to 
possession of a stolen rifl e, possession of marijuana for the purposes of traffi  cking, 
and possession of a fi rearm while subject to an order that prohibited him from doing 
so, among other off ences. He challenged the mandatory minimum sentence for 
possession of a stolen fi rearm under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter. Th e facts 
underlying the accused’s guilty pleas were not recited by the court in much detail.205 
While Justice Desotti listed some of the factors identifi ed in Smith206 and 
Latimer207 as relevant to the assessment of gross disproportionality,208 he placed 
emphasis on the legislative purpose, describing the mandatory minimum sentence as 
201. See e.g. Martin, supra note 174 (dismissing the appeal of an Indigenous off ender claiming 
that a mandatory minimum sentence of 14 days for driving with a blood alcohol level above 
0.08 violated s 12).
202. For an example of a successful challenge under s 12, see R v Bill (1997), 13 CR (5th) 103, 
37 WCB (2d) 305 (BC SC) (holding that the imposition of the mandatory minimum 
sentence for manslaughter under s 236(a) of the Code violated s 12 of the Charter). For the 
BC Supreme Court’s analysis under s 1, see R v Bill (1998), 13 CR (5th) 125, 1998 CanLII 
1446. See also Massettoe, supra note 200.
203. Supra note 45.
204. Supra note 174 at para 14.
205. Ibid at paras 3-4.
206. Supra note 137.
207. Supra note 184.
208. Bressette, supra note 174 at paras 6-7.
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“a specifi c and calculated attempt by Parliament to refl ect Canadian and community 
values and the harm that occurs as a result of the illegal use of fi rearms.”209 
Without actually addressing the off ender’s argument that his circumstances as an 
Indigenous person should be considered when determining the proportionality 
of the sentence, Justice Desotti made the point that fi rearms off ences represent 
a “serious and meaningful” threat within Indigenous communities and, for this 
reason, a mandatory minimum was warranted in the circumstances.210 Justice 
Desotti’s section 12 analysis failed to consider crucial factors identifi ed in Smith and 
Latimer, such as “the personal characteristics of the off ender,”211 “the actual eff ect 
of the punishment on the individual,”212 and “the existence of valid alternatives 
to the punishment imposed,”213 choosing instead to focus entirely on the gravity 
of the off ence and Parliament’s objectives of general deterrence or denunciation. 
Furthermore, after concluding that section 96(2)(a) would not result in a grossly 
disproportionate sentence in the particular circumstances of the accused, Justice 
Desotti failed to proceed to the second stage of the Smith analysis, in which 
“reasonable hypothetical circumstances”214 are to be considered.
In R v Sheppard,215 Justice Jenkins of the Provincial Court of Newfoundland 
and Labrador held that the mandatory minimum sentence under section 244(2)
(b) of the Code,216 discharging a fi rearm with the intent to wound, did not violate 
section 12. Shane Sheppard, whose specifi c Indigenous ancestry is not identifi ed 
in the court’s reasons, pleaded guilty to discharging a fi rearm with the intent to 
wound, aggravated assault, use of a handgun in a robbery, and forcible confi nement. 
Along with his co-accused, Mr. Sheppard planned the armed robbery of a grocery 
store in an eff ort to pay back large, drug-related debts. After duct-taping the store 
manager to a chair and gagging her at gunpoint, the three men stole the store’s 
surveillance equipment and recordings. Th ey were subsequently overwhelmed by 
fear and fl ed the scene without stealing the store vault. Th e following day, Mr. 
Sheppard was asked by one of his co-accused, Th omas Hickey, to shoot him so 
that Mr. Hickey’s creditors would have more sympathy for him and give him more 
time to pay back his debt. Mr. Hickey coaxed the accused by agreeing to forgive 
209. Ibid at para 10.
210. Ibid at para 13.
211. Smith, supra note 137 at para 56.
212. Latimer, supra note 184 at para 75.
213. Ibid.
214. Goltz, supra note 182 at 506.
215. (2011), 310 Nfl d & PEIR 277, 241 CRR (2d) 14 (NL Prov Ct) [Sheppard cited to Nfl d & 
PEIR].
216. Supra note 45.
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him of a $7000 debt. Mr. Hickey then loaded and cocked the gun and guided it to 
his shoulder, and Mr. Sheppard pulled the trigger. Th e only off ence to which Mr. 
Sheppard pleaded guilty that featured a mandatory minimum was discharging a 
fi rearm with the intent to wound. He challenged the four-year mandatory sentence 
under section 12. 
In arriving at the conclusion that the mandatory minimum did not violate 
section 12, Justice Jenkins considered several of the factors outlined in Smith and 
Latimer: the gravity of the off ence,217 the personal characteristics of the off ender,218 
the penological goals and sentencing principles,219 and the actual eff ect of the 
punishment.220 However, the force driving Justice Jenkins’s analysis was the 
seriousness of the off ence,221 a common thread in section 12 cases. Th e unusual 
facts of this case would seem to support the accused’s argument that a four-year 
mandatory minimum would be grossly disproportionate in the circumstances. Not 
only did the victim of the fi rearm discharge consent to being shot, Mr. Hickey 
actively persuaded the accused to participate in the criminal act. While the accused 
did participate in a violent robbery on the previous day, the court’s section 12 
analysis should have been limited to the specifi c circumstances surrounding the 
off ence which featured a mandatory minimum. 
Given the bizarre scenario leading to the fi rearm discharge, the court’s holding 
that the four-year sentence was proportionate to the seriousness of the off ence seems 
unwarranted. Th is is especially true given that Justice Jenkins failed to adequately 
account for the accused’s Indigenous identity. While Justice Jenkins did briefl y 
acknowledge the accused’s status as an Indigenous person,222 she did not explore 
217. Sheppard, supra note 215 at para 29 (claiming, “One cannot overstate the gravity of this 
off ence.”).
218. Ibid at para 32 (including education, age, employment history, and Indigenous identity).
219. Ibid at paras 35-39 (including proportionality, the potential for rehabilitation, and general 
deterrence).
220. Ibid at paras 40-41.
221. Th e gravity of the off ence is mentioned no less than eight times in the thirteen pages of the 
court’s reasons. See ibid at paras 29, 31, 35, 38, 42.
222. Ibid at para 32 (observing that “Mr. Sheppard is an aboriginal person.”). Jenkins J did 
go on to consider the Indigenous identity of the accused in sentencing him for his other 
convictions. Tellingly, however, Jenkins J concluded that Gladue
does not serve to change the fundamental responsibility of the sentencing Judge. … [I]n this 
particular case there is nothing before the Court to substantiate that the circumstances of Mr. 
Sheppard, pertaining to his aboriginal descent, which would override the remaining objectives 
and principles to such a degree as to interfere with the principles set forth and argued by counsel 
and to reduce the sentence set forth herein.
See ibid at para 56.
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how the assessment of proportionality under section 12 might be transformed by 
this fact. Instead, in a manner similar to Bressette and consistent with the trends in 
post-Smith Court jurisprudence, the court’s reasoning in Sheppard demonstrates a 
willingness to defer to Parliament’s goals of general deterrence and denunciation. 
Again, like in Bressette, “reasonable hypothetical circumstances”223 did not form a 
part of Justice Jenkins’s section 12 analysis.224
In my view, neither of these recent decisions from disparately situated Canadian 
jurisdictions gave suffi  cient consideration to how the insights contained in the 
Gladue case law necessarily transform the section 12 analysis in cases of Indigenous 
off enders. Neither Bressette nor Sheppard adequately addressed the fact that the 
off ender in each case was Indigenous, let alone the undeniable connections between 
the legacy of colonialism and the ongoing crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration. 
In Part IV(B), below, I argue that the section 12 analysis must be developed in a 
manner that is responsive to the particular realities of Indigenous off enders. 
B. SECTION 12 CHALLENGES TO MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES 
Drawing upon Gladue and the jurisprudence that has followed it, I identify some 
starting points for ways in which the assessment of cruel and unusual punishment 
may be transformed in the cases of Indigenous off enders. To be clear, what follows 
is a skeletal outline of the ways in which the section 12 analytical criteria can be 
mobilized in the cases of Indigenous off enders to formulate persuasive arguments 
that mandatory minimum sentences are unconstitutional. Further work and 
research will be necessary to fl esh out the arguments and analysis below.
It should also be noted at the outset that many of the factors explored in 
this section are overlapping and mutually reinforcing. Th e factors that have been 
applied in the section 12 jurisprudence cannot be readily parsed into discrete 
sections. To provide one example, considerations that arise in the “circumstances 
of the off ender” may also be relevant to determining “the actual eff ect of the 
punishment on the off ender.” Accordingly, some of the insights from Gladue and 
other cases that I have identifi ed as relevant to one stage of the analysis may also 
have applications at other stages. 
223. Goltz, supra note 182 at 506.
224. To be fair, the court was not presented with any reasonable hypotheticals by counsel for the 
accused. See e.g. ibid at para 23. Nonetheless, courts arguably have a duty when performing 
the s 12 analysis to complete this second stage of the Smith analysis regardless of whether or 
not it is specifi cally argued by counsel.
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1. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER
One of the two principal elements of the Gladue analysis involves a consideration 
of the “unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in 
bringing the particular aboriginal off ender before the courts.”225 In Ipeelee, Justice 
LeBel reinforced this fundamental principle in the reasons of the majority:
[C]ourts must take judicial notice of such matters as the history of colonialism, 
displacement, and residential schools and how that history continues to translate 
into lower educational attainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, higher 
rates of substance abuse and suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration for 
Aboriginal peoples. Th ese matters, on their own, do not necessarily justify a diff erent 
sentence for Aboriginal off enders. Rather, they provide the necessary context for 
understanding and evaluating the case-specifi c information presented by counsel. 
Counsel have a duty to bring that individualized information before the court in 
every case, unless the off ender expressly waives his right to have it considered.226
From the foregoing, there are two points I would like to stress. First, when 
assessing the meaning of gross disproportionality under section 12 in the context 
of a mandatory minimum sentence for an Indigenous off ender, the systemic and 
background factors that contribute to Indigenous over-incarceration should form 
an integral part of the analysis of the “circumstances of the off ender.” Courts’ 
responsibility to acknowledge this indisputable reality does not evaporate merely 
because Parliament has legislated a mandatory minimum sentence for a specifi c 
crime. Rather, when considering the proportionality of a mandatory minimum 
sentence for an Indigenous off ender, courts have a duty to take judicial notice of 
the impacts of colonialism, displacement, and poverty. Doing so will allow courts to 
more accurately assess the ways in which the imposition of a mandatory minimum 
could exacerbate the crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration and, as a result, be 
grossly disproportionate. Second, while the generalized context of colonialism and 
dispossession unquestionably must form a backdrop for the section 12 assessment 
in the cases of Indigenous off enders, defence counsel have an obligation to present 
evidence of how the specifi c circumstances of the accused have been shaped by this 
legacy. While the Court recently clarifi ed in Ipeelee that Gladue does not require “a 
causal link between background factors and the commission of the current off ence 
before being entitled to have those matters considered by the sentencing judge,”227 
it is clear that evidence connecting the circumstances of the accused to the relevant 
background factors will ultimately be more persuasive. Doing so will give courts a 
225. Gladue, supra note 8 at para 66.
226. Supra note 71 at para 60 [emphasis in the original].
227. Ibid at para 81.
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more solid foundation on which to base a fi nding of gross disproportionality and 
to strike down the mandatory minimum at hand.
2. APPROPRIATE RANGE OF SENTENCES 
In Smith, Justice Lamer suggested that the purpose of considering the circumstances 
of the case at this stage of the section 12 analysis is to determine which “range of 
sentences would have been appropriate to punish, rehabilitate or deter this particular 
off ender or to protect the public from this particular off ender.”228 Th us, the purpose 
of the section 12 analysis at this stage is to assess the range of sentences that, but 
for the mandatory minimum, would be necessary to meet specifi c sentencing 
objectives. In the absence of a mandatory minimum, the sentencing analysis is 
governed by the fundamental purposes and principles laid out in sections 718, 
718.1, and 718.2 of the Code.229 
In the cases of Indigenous off enders, at this stage of the analysis, special 
attention must be paid to section 718.2(e) of the Code. In order to determine the 
appropriate sentence in the absence of a mandatory minimum in cases involving 
an Indigenous off ender, courts must apply the Gladue and Ipeelee analysis. 
Despite the fact that determining the appropriate sentence in the absence of a 
mandatory minimum is a particularized inquiry, insights from Gladue about the 
general effi  cacy of incarceration for Indigenous off enders are extremely relevant 
here, especially in light of the fact that rehabilitation is among the key sentencing 
objectives that should guide the determination. As indicated in many of the 
commissions and studies outlined in Part I, above, custodial sentences are even 
less likely to have the desired rehabilitative eff ect for Indigenous people than for 
non-Indigenous people. As Justices Iacobucci and Cory recognized in Gladue, 
Indigenous people are “more adversely aff ected by incarceration and less likely 
to be ‘rehabilitated’ thereby, because the internment milieu is often culturally 
inappropriate and regrettably discrimination towards them is so often rampant in 
penal institutions.”230 If, as the Court recognized in 1999, incarceration is culturally 
alienating for Indigenous off enders and, as a result, less likely to serve one of 
its key purposes—rehabilitation—courts should incorporate this understanding 
into their analysis of the appropriate range of sentences at this stage of the section 
12 analysis. In other words, the recognition in Gladue that prison is an especially 
alienating place for Indigenous people is one consideration that should shape the 
228. Supra note 137 at 56 [emphasis added].
229. See Smickle, supra note 174 at para 49, Molloy J (noting that the s 12 analysis at this stage 
should proceed with reference to the sentencing principles contained in the Code).
230. Supra note 8 at para 68.
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way that courts consider the appropriate range of sentences in the absence of a 
mandatory minimum.
3. EXISTENCE OF VALID ALTERNATIVES
Th e second major aspect of the Gladue analysis involves assessing “[t]he types of 
sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances 
for the off ender because of his or her particular aboriginal heritage or connection.”231 
Th is principle should infl uence courts’ considerations of the existence of valid 
alternatives to incarceration under the gross disproportionality analysis.232 In 
Ipeelee, the Court affi  rmed:
Th e Gladue principles direct sentencing judges to abandon the presumption that all 
off enders and all communities share the same values when it comes to sentencing 
and to recognize that, given these fundamentally diff erent world views, diff erent 
or alternative sanctions may more eff ectively achieve the objectives of sentencing in a 
particular community.233
As was explored briefl y in Part II, above, in the years following Gladue, 
restorative justice initiatives have developed across the country. While the 
accessibility of such initiatives varies regionally, in many cases such initiatives 
represent viable alternatives to the imposition of custodial sentences for Indigenous 
people. Th e availability of restorative justice alternatives to imprisonment should 
lead courts to more readily hold that the imposition of a mandatory minimum 
sentence constitutes a violation of section 12. Sending more Indigenous people 
to prison rather than making use of restorative alternatives would seem to be 
all the more cruel and unusual in light of the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
incarceration is a less eff ective rehabilitative strategy for Indigenous off enders. Not 
only is it less likely to serve one of the key sentencing objectives, prison is also 
inadequate because Indigenous people, by virtue of their cultural identities, have 
access to a greater breadth of alternatives to incarceration. Again, the existence 
of these alternatives, many of which are not only sanctioned but also funded by 
the Canadian state, necessarily colours the meaning of gross disproportionality 
for Indigenous off enders.
231. Ibid at para 66.
232. See Latimer, supra note 184 at para 75.
233. Supra note 71 at para 74 [emphasis added].
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4. THE PENOLOGICAL GOALS AND SENTENCING PRINCIPLES OF THE 
MANDATORY MINIMUM
At this stage of the section 12 analysis, a court “determine[s] whether Parliament 
was responding to a pressing problem, and whether its response is founded on 
recognized sentencing principles.”234 As is evident from the above review of 
Bressette235 and Sheppard,236 courts often hold that the primary penological goals 
underlying mandatory minimums are denunciation and general deterrence. Th e 
rhetoric employed by the Conservatives in the parliamentary debates following 
the introduction of the SSCA reinforces this interpretation of the legislative intent 
underlying the SSCA’s mandatory minimums. Th e section 12 jurisprudence is 
clear that Parliament is entitled to craft mandatory minimum sentences as long 
as it does so “in a manner consistent with existing sentencing principles,”237 which 
include denunciation and general deterrence, among others. As noted in Part III(A), 
above, the Court’s post-Smith jurisprudence has become increasingly deferential 
to Parliament’s choice about which sentencing principles to stress in the creation 
of mandatory minimums. However, the Court has also stated that “[t]he presence 
or absence of any one sentencing principle should never be determinative at this 
stage of the analysis under s. 12. General deterrence cannot, on its own, prevent a 
punishment from being cruel and unusual.”238 Here, the Court reminds us that there 
is a limit to the deference it is willing to give to Parliament’s sentencing objectives. 
In order to survive scrutiny under section 12, a mandatory minimum sentence 
cannot be singularly fi xated on achieving one of the myriad objectives that govern 
Canadian sentencing law. 
Th e analysis of the penological goals that underlie a specifi c mandatory 
minimum sentence in the case of an Indigenous off ender should not occur in the 
abstract. Rather, courts should consider insights from Gladue about the relevance of 
specifi c penological goals in the context of Indigenous communities: “A signifi cant 
problem experienced by aboriginal people who come into contact with the criminal 
justice system is that the traditional sentencing ideals of deterrence, separation, 
and denunciation are often far removed from the understanding of sentencing 
held by these off enders and their community.”239 Th e objectives animating a 
mandatory minimum sentence should be considered in light of judicial authority 
234. Morrisey, supra note 185 at para 43.
235. Supra note 174.
236. Supra note 215.
237. Morrisey, supra note 185 at para 44.
238. Ibid at para 45 [emphasis added].
239. Gladue, supra note 8 at para 70.
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acknowledging that the traditional sentencing principles have limited purchase 
among Indigenous communities. When courts assess Parliament’s penological goals 
for the purposes of determining whether a mandatory minimum sentence would 
result in cruel and unusual punishment if imposed on an Indigenous off ender, 
the diminished applicability of the principles of deterrence, separation, and 
denunciation in the cases of Indigenous off enders must be considered.
5. IMAGINING REASONABLE HYPOTHETICALS
Th e section 12 analysis employed in Smith240 represents a signifi cant hurdle to the 
implementation of tough-on-crime policies largely because of Justice Lamer’s use 
of a hypothetical off ender to assess the meaning of gross disproportionality. While 
the Court has gradually restricted the breadth of this analytical tool in subsequent 
cases, Smith remains good law on this point. Consequently, Indigenous people 
bringing section 12 challenges to the SSCA would be well advised to think creatively 
and present courts with hypothetical scenarios that reveal the disproportionality 
of the mandatory minimum, even if the circumstances of the accused have failed 
to do so. Such arguments can be made in the alternative to those that frame the 
sentence as cruel and unusual in the specifi c circumstances of the accused. While 
hypothetical examples must not be “far-fetched or only marginally imaginable 
as a live possibility,”241 there remains considerable breadth for counsel to present 
scenarios that drive home the potential for mandatory minimums to result in 
cruel and unusual punishment. 
Reasonable hypotheticals can be employed by Indigenous off enders to highlight 
the potential for gross disproportionality to arise in light of the well-established 
causes of Indigenous over-incarceration. In cases where there is a lack of specifi c 
evidence connecting the circumstances of the off ence with the background factors 
identifi ed as relevant in Gladue, the second stage of the section 12 analysis provides 
an opportunity to imagine hypothetical scenarios in which those connections can 
be made more explicit. Where an Indigenous accused is unable to present evidence 
that concretely connects the legacy of colonialism, residential schools, endemic 
poverty, or other background factors to the off ence in issue, such circumstances 
can be imagined and presented to draw a court’s attention to the potential for gross 
disproportionality to arise in the cases of other Indigenous off enders. Real cases can be 
drawn upon to develop “reasonable hypotheticals,”242 and the decade-plus of Gladue 
jurisprudence off ers no shortage of such cases to use as starting points to this end. 
240. Supra note 137.
241. Goltz, supra note 182 at 515.
242. Morrisey, supra note 185 at para 65.
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R v Bouchard243 is an example of a case that may be helpful as a 
“reasonable hypothetical” in the context of the SSCA’s amendments to the CDSA. 
Jessica Bouchard, a thirty-three-year-old Indigenous woman from Long Lake 58 
First Nation in Northern Ontario, pled guilty to traffi  cking in marijuana. She 
had purchased marijuana and given it to three young girls, one of whom was 
her niece. In its summary of Bouchard’s pre-sentence report, the court indicated 
that the accused had grown up in a family aff ected by substance abuse and had 
intermittently lived with relatives and under foster care. Th e accused had been 
physically abused by both of her parents and had been sexually abused while in 
foster care as well as by members of her extended family. As an early adolescent, the 
accused started using alcohol and drugs as a means to cope. Th e court also noted 
that members of the accused’s family, like many others in her community, had 
attended residential school. Th e accused had a long criminal record and she had 
previously been sentenced to jail. Justice DiGiuseppe noted the “inter-generational 
impact that violence, neglect and substance abuse has had on Ms. Bouchard.”244 
After applying the Gladue analysis and acknowledging that the “range of sentence 
must be tempered to refl ect those systemic factors that have contributed to Ms. 
Bouchard’s off ending behaviour and address her rehabilitation,”245 the court 
sentenced her to a four-month term of imprisonment. 
In contrast, if Ms. Bouchard were to be sentenced on the basis of the amended 
CDSA, she would likely face a mandatory minimum sentence of two years. A person 
convicted of traffi  cking who “involves” a person under eighteen “in committing 
the off ence” is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of two years.246 Th e 
term “traffi  c” is defi ned broadly in the CDSA and includes “to sell, administer, 
give, transfer, transport, send or deliver the substance.”247 While this provision has 
yet to be interpreted by a court, by providing marijuana to three girls under the 
age of eighteen the accused arguably “involved” them in the commission of the 
off ence. Th is interpretation is confi rmed by the Department of Justice, which 
has taken the position that the amendment captures traffi  cking “in relation to a 
youth.”248 As a result, Ms. Bouchard would be subject to a two-year mandatory 
minimum sentence based on the aggravating factor stipulated in section 5(3)(a)
243. 2012 ONCJ 425, 101 WCB (2d) 571 [Bouchard].
244. Ibid at para 20.
245. Ibid at para 25.
246. CDSA, supra note 103, s 5(3)(a)(ii)(C).
247. Ibid, s 2(1)(a) [emphasis added].
248. News Release, “Backgrounder: Safe Streets & Communities Act: Increased Penalties for Serious 
Drug Crime” (30 April 2013) online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2011/
doc_32636.html>.
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(ii)(C) of the CDSA. A two-year sentence, in stark contrast to the four-month 
term that she received after the court’s careful consideration of the Gladue factors, 
would seem to be grossly disproportionate. Bouchard is thus an example of a case 
in the Gladue jurisprudence that could prove to be helpful to counsel attempting 
to construct “reasonable hypothetical” scenarios in which the imposition of a 
mandatory minimum would result in cruel and unusual punishment.
Two recent decisions penned by diff erent judges of the Superior Court of 
Ontario raise questions about the fate of the “reasonable hypothetical” scenario 
analysis in the context of hybrid off ences. Neither case involved an Indigenous 
off ender. Nonetheless, the fact that the vast majority of the SSCA’s mandatory 
minimum sentences are associated with hybrid off ences makes certain facets of the 
decisions particularly relevant to this discussion. Released within six months of 
one another, R v Nur249 and R v Smickle250 analyzed the constitutionality of section 
95(2) of the Code and reached opposite conclusions. Both cases were heard by the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in February 2013. At the time of this writing, however, 
the Court of Appeal’s judgments have not yet been released. To my knowledge, 
the applicability of the analysis of “reasonable hypotheticals” in the context of 
hybrid off ences has yet to be considered by any appellate court in Canada.251 
Th us the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeal in Nur and Smickle will 
have signifi cant bearing on the potential of section 12 to protect against cruel 
and unusual punishment eff ected by the SSCA’s mandatory minimum sentences. 
In Nur, Justice Code considered the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum 
sentence of three years’ imprisonment, on indictment, for possession of a loaded 
prohibited fi rearm. After indicating that there was little diffi  culty in constructing 
hypothetical scenarios in which the imposition of a three-year sentence would 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment, Justice Code went on to fi nd that the 
Crown’s discretion to proceed summarily in such circumstances provided a “complete 
answer to all of the ‘reasonable hypotheticals.’”252 In Nur, section 95(1) of the 
Code managed to survive section 12 scrutiny because the Crown’s discretion to 
proceed summarily in such circumstances would supposedly prevent comparable 
hypothetical scenarios from ever arising on indictment. According to Justice 
Code’s analysis, when faced with one of the hypothetical scenarios imagined in 
Nur, the Crown would choose to prosecute summarily, thereby circumscribing the 
249. 2011 ONSC 4874, 241 CRR (2d) 306 [Nur cited to ONSC].
250. Supra note 174.
251. As Code J pointed out in Nur, the Court has not yet had occasion to develop this branch of 
the s 12 analysis in the circumstances of a hybrid off ence. See supra note 249 at para 110.  
252. Ibid at para 108.
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possibility of gross disproportionality in those cases. Given that Justice Code had 
already determined that the three-year sentence imposed by section 95(2) of the 
Code was not grossly disproportionate to the appropriate sentence in the absence 
of a mandatory minimum and given that the Crown’s discretion to prosecute 
summarily was a “complete answer” to the hypothetical scenarios imagined, there 
was no violation of section 12.
Justice Code acknowledged that the Crown’s decision about how to proceed is 
usually made early in the proceedings, before all of the information relevant to its 
election may be available.253 In doing so, he recognized that the gross disproportionality 
fl owing from the Crown’s choice to proceed by way of indictment might only become 
apparent as the full facts are revealed at trial. In such a case, Justice Code recognized 
that “one unwise Crown election may end up invalidating Parliament’s s. 95 sentencing 
scheme for all cases.”254 
In fact, within six months of the release of Justice Code’s reasons in Nur, precisely 
this kind of situation arose in Smickle.255 In Smickle, Justice Molloy had the occasion 
to reconsider whether section 95(2) violated section 12 in the case of a twenty-seven-
year-old man who was caught posing in front of his laptop with a loaded handgun. Th e 
Crown had elected to proceed by way of indictment, which, as stated above, carried 
a three-year mandatory minimum sentence.256 At the fi rst stage of the analysis, Justice 
Molloy held that the appropriate sentence in the absence of a mandatory minimum 
would be one year.257 Accordingly, the mandatory minimum sentence of three years 
was grossly disproportionate, making it unnecessary to proceed to consider “reasonable 
hypothetical” scenarios.258
Smickle confi rms the risk that Justice Code acknowledged in Nur, raising serious 
questions about Justice Code’s approach to “reasonable hypothetical” scenarios in 
cases involving hybrid off ences. A situation akin to the easily constructed hypothetical 
scenarios described by Justice Code in Nur arose on the facts of Smickle, and the 
prosecutorial discretion to proceed summarily did not prevent the potential for a grossly 
disproportionate sentence being imposed. In other words, what Justice Code referred 
to in Nur as a “constitutional ‘safety valve’”259 did not function the way it should have. 
253. Ibid at para 117.
254. Ibid.
255. Supra note 174.
256. For a recent discussion of the implications of Smickle for the constitutionality of mandatory 
minimum sentences, see Debra Parkes, “From Smith to Smickle: the Charter’s Minimal 
Impact on Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2012) 57 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 149
257. Smickle, supra note 174 at para 75.
258. Ibid at para 85.
259. Supra note 249 at para 117.
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Smickle makes it clear that there is still a place for the “reasonable hypotheticals” 
analysis in the case of hybrid off ences. Putting aside the infl uence that systemic 
racism has on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and assuming, without 
accepting, that it is always exercised in good faith,260 prosecutors do not always 
have the facts they need to make the election in the correct direction. As Justice 
Molloy stated in her analysis of whether the violation of section 12 could be 
justifi ed under section 1, “Often, the full facts will not be known until the trial 
judge delivers his or her reasons or the jury delivers a verdict.”261 Th is is especially 
true in the cases of Indigenous off enders, given the fact that the Crown may not even 
know the off ender’s Indigenous identity at the time it makes its election, let alone how 
the background factors identifi ed in Gladue might relate to the circumstances of the 
off ence. Accordingly, there are signifi cant dangers associated with entrusting the Crown 
with the responsibility of ensuring constitutional compliance by way of election in the 
context of hybrid off ences.
Interestingly, the Crown argued in Smith that the constitutionality of the 
mandatory minimum in that case was preserved by the fact that the prosecution 
possessed the discretion to charge for a lesser off ence in cases where gross 
disproportionality would arise. Justice Lamer rejected the Crown’s argument 
as follows:
In my view the section cannot be salvaged by relying on the discretion of the 
prosecution not to apply the law in those cases where, in the opinion of the 
prosecution, its application would be a violation of the Charter. To do so would be 
to disregard totally s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 which provides that any law 
which is inconsistent with the Constitution is of no force or eff ect to the extent of the 
inconsistency and the courts are duty bound to make that pronouncement, not to 
delegate the avoidance of a violation to the prosecution or to anyone else for that 
matter.262
While the prosecutorial discretion to charge for a lesser off ence is admittedly 
distinct from the statutory prosecutorial discretion of election,263 the same reasoning 
applies. As stated by Justice Molloy in Smickle, “the suggested safety valve with 
respect to electing to proceed summarily rather than by indictment is no less 
260. For a thorough discussion of the manner in which systemic racism shapes black peoples’ 
experiences in the Canadian criminal justice system, specifi cally in the context of mandatory 
minimum sentences, see Faizal R Mirza,  “Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentencing and 
Systemic Racism” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall LJ 497.
261. Smickle, supra note 174 at para 110.
262. Smith, supra note 137 at para 69.
263. Th is distinction was emphasized by Code J in Nur. See supra note 249 at para 112.
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problematic.”264 Smickle makes it clear that situations in which the Crown makes 
an inappropriate election are bound to arise, and it is this certainty that makes the 
analysis of “reasonable hypotheticals” necessary. 
It may be argued that the analysis of hypothetical scenarios remains unnecessary 
in the context of hybrid off ences because in cases like Smickle, where the Crown’s 
election is made improperly or on the basis of incomplete facts, the imposition 
of a mandatory minimum sentence will nonetheless be subject to constitutional 
review. Leroy Smickle got his day in court and the constitutionality of section 95(2) 
was considered on the basis of the actual facts of his case rather than an imagined 
scenario. Because the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of three years 
would have resulted in cruel and unusual punishment on the facts of the case, 
section 95(2) of the Code was struck down as unconstitutional. However, such 
an argument is premised on a misunderstanding of the mechanics of the criminal 
justice system. Most criminal defendants do not go to trial. Th e vast majority of 
criminal defendants plead guilty, thereby waiving their right to a trial.265 While 
offi  cial statistics about the scope of the practice are unavailable,266 commentators 
estimate that 70 to 95 per cent of cases are resolved through guilty pleas.267 Th e 
respective bargaining positions of the Crown and the accused are inherently 
unequal, and the coercive elements at play in the process of plea bargaining have 
been noted by scholars.268 Mandatory minimum sentences place increased pressure 
on accused persons to plead guilty to lesser off ences,269 magnifying the imbalance of 
power in bargaining positions between the Crown and the accused.270 In his analysis 
264. Supra note 174 at para 110.
265. Alan Young has described the guilty plea as “the most dramatic manifestation of waiver. Th e 
panoply of procedural safeguards at trial can be circumvented by this admission of guilt.” See 
“‘Not Waving but Drowning’: A Look at Waiver and Collective Constitutional Rights in the 
Criminal Process” (1989) 53:1 Sask L Rev 47 at 71.
266. Mia Dauvergne, “Adult Criminal Court Statistics in Canada, 2010/2011” in Statistics 
Canada, Juristat (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, May 2012) at 10, online: <http://www.
statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2012001/article/11646-eng.pdf> (“Th e extent to which plea 
negotiations are utilized in Canada is unknown.”).
267. See Oonagh E Fitzgerald, Th e Guilty Plea and Summary Justice (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) 
at 168; Young, supra note 265 at 71; Joseph Di Luca, “Expedient McJustice or Principled 
Alternative Dispute Resolution? A Review of Plea Bargaining in Canada” (2005) 50:1&2 
Crim LQ 14 at 15.
268. See e.g. Fitzgerald, supra note 267 at 137-68.
269. See Di Luca, supra note 267 at 31; Roach, supra note 196 at 382.
270. Th is reality was acknowledged by Molloy J as one of the deleterious eff ects of the mandatory 
minimum regime in Smickle. In his view, there is an “unfair advantage given to the Crown as 
an accused will be under pressure to plead guilty to a lesser included off ence in order to avoid 
the risk of a the mandatory minimum.” See supra note 174 at para 121.
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of systemic anti-black racism in the Canadian criminal justice system, Faizal R. 
Mirza argues that “[m]andatory prison sentences enhance the quasi-judicial role 
of prosecutors, providing them with greater leverage to convict a disproportionate 
number of Black persons.”271 Mirza’s insight is equally applicable in the context 
of Indigenous defendants.
Given the prevalence of guilty pleas in general and the increased pressure to 
engage in plea bargaining when faced with a mandatory minimum, many accused 
persons in the position of Leroy Smickle will never get their day in court. Most 
people facing mandatory minimum sentences for hybrid off ences for which the 
Crown has elected to proceed by way of indictment on the basis of incomplete 
facts will not commit the resources or be willing to undertake the risk involved in 
launching a section 12 constitutional challenge. Instead, most accused persons in 
the position of Leroy Smickle, a portion of whom may be innocent,272 will plead 
guilty in an attempt to secure a less onerous sentence than the mandatory minimum 
that looms over their heads, however grossly disproportionate that sentence 
is in light of the facts. Beyond the scope of rigorous constitutional review, it is 
inevitable that such sentences, negotiated in the shadow of mandatory minimums, 
will be infl ated and will result in cruel and unusual punishment. It is this reality 
that makes the analysis of “reasonable hypotheticals” a necessary element of the 
section 12 analysis. 
V. CONCLUSION
Th e SSCA is a step in precisely the wrong direction. It is also a manifestation of a 
much larger problem. As the enactment of the SSCA leads to the incarceration 
of thousands more Indigenous people, it will perpetuate the colonial power 
dynamics between the Canadian state and Indigenous people. Ignoring the 
voices of Indigenous advocates, activists, and scholars, and fl ying in the face 
of the countless studies outlined in Part I, above—which have identifi ed the 
legacies of colonialism and dispossession as the root causes of the crisis of over-
incarceration—the Conservative government has chosen instead to formulate 
tough-on-crime policies that will further alienate Indigenous people from the 
Canadian criminal justice system. 
271. Supra note 260 at 504.
272. Christopher Sherrin estimates that as many as thousands of innocent accused persons plead 
guilty in Canada each year. See “Guilty Pleas from the Innocent” (2011) 30 Windsor Rev 
Legal Soc Issues 1 at 6.
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In Part I, I relied on the several commissions, inquiries, and reports published 
in the last thirty years to explore the dimensions and underlying causes of the 
ongoing crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration. I concluded that, at its most 
fundamental, the crisis of Indigenous over-representation in the Canadian criminal 
justice system is a function of the legacy and ongoing impacts of colonialism. Such 
a conclusion indicates that reform to the Canadian sentencing regime will only go 
so far to address the crisis. Instead, a fundamental shift in the relationship between 
Indigenous people and the Canadian state is necessary. 
In Part II, I assessed the legislative and judicial interventions undertaken to 
address this crisis. I concluded that the contextualized sentencing model legislated 
by section 718.2(e) of the Code and interpreted by the Court in Gladue has made 
positive, if limited, steps towards addressing Indigenous over-representation. I 
explored some of the explanations for the muted eff ect that Gladue has had in the 
face of growing rates of incarceration of Indigenous people. I pointed out that the 
Court’s recent decision in Ipeelee off ers a reason to hope that Gladue’s potential 
to help reduce Indigenous over-incarceration in the context of serious off ences 
can still be realized. 
In Part III, I described the way that the SSCA was framed and discussed 
in Parliament before analyzing some of the ways that the Act will lead to 
the imprisonment of even greater numbers of Indigenous people. While the 
eff ectiveness of the contextualized sentencing methodology can certainly be 
questioned, in Part III I argued that the wholesale elimination of judicial discretion 
in the context of several criminal off ences will surely only make matters worse. 
In Part IV, I explored one avenue for constitutional challenge of the SSCA’s 
several mandatory minimum sentencing provisions, section 12 of the Charter. In 
doing so, I developed a kind of harm-reduction strategy to address the aspects of the 
SSCA most likely to exacerbate the ongoing crisis of over-incarceration. Th e section 
12 analysis must be reconfi gured in order to account for the unique circumstances 
of Indigenous people. If the protection against cruel and unusual punishment 
provided by section 12 is to be meaningful, courts cannot aff ord to ignore the crisis 
of Indigenous over-incarceration. Given the grossly disproportionate number of 
Indigenous people inside Canadian prisons and the likelihood that the SSCA will 
only magnify the problem, courts hearing section 12 challenges by Indigenous 
off enders should use the analytical tools that they have inherited from the Court’s 
section 12 jurisprudence to refashion the meaning of gross disproportionality. 
Not only are there opportunities within the section 12 analytical framework to 
develop a particularized defi nition of cruel and unusual punishment in the context 
of Indigenous off enders, there is ample support for such an undertaking in the 
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Court’s post-Gladue jurisprudence. In Ipeelee, the Court confi rmed in no uncertain 
terms that sentencing judges have an obligation to consider the Gladue principles 
whenever an Indigenous off ender comes before them, no matter how “serious” 
the off ence at hand.273 While there is clearly work to be done in reconciling such 
statements with the prevailing trends of deference in the section 12 jurisprudence 
on mandatory minimums, the Court’s judgment in Ipeelee supports the proposition 
that the gravity of the off ence (and the associated principles of general deterrence 
and denunciation) should not be allowed to overtake all other considerations when 
courts are deciphering the meaning of gross disproportionality. 
My hope is that section 12 can be employed to contain the destructive eff ects of 
the SSCA and in doing so create space for the continued development of restorative 
justice alternatives to incarceration. While such a strategy will not, in and of 
itself, lead to the kind of transformative social change necessary to decolonize the 
relationship between Indigenous people and the Canadian state, there is reason 
to believe that section 12 can be a useful tool in attempting to reduce the harm 
that could be done by the SSCA to Indigenous people.
273. Supra note 71 at para 87. 
